diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 64cc079b3..3c99c64e9 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ require ( github.com/urfave/cli v1.20.0 github.com/willf/bitset v0.0.0-20180426185212-8ce1146b8621 // indirect github.com/yohcop/openid-go v0.0.0-20160914080427-2c050d2dae53 - golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad + golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20191101175033-0deb6923b6d9 golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.0.0-20190604053449-0f29369cfe45 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190910064555-bbd175535a8b diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index 24b7f6f92..344371168 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190617133340-57b3e21c3d56/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8U golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190701094942-4def268fd1a4/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad h1:5E5raQxcv+6CZ11RrBYQe5WRbUIWpScjh0kvHZkZIrQ= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f h1:kz4KIr+xcPUsI3VMoqWfPMvtnJ6MGfiVwsWSVzphMO4= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190121172915-509febef88a4/go.mod h1:CJ0aWSM057203Lf6IL+f9T1iT9GByDxfZKAQTCR3kQA= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190510132918-efd6b22b2522/go.mod h1:ZjyILWgesfNpC6sMxTJOJm9Kp84zZh5NQWvqDGG3Qr8= golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20190731235908-ec7cb31e5a56/go.mod h1:JhuoJpWY28nO4Vef9tZUw9qufEGTyX1+7lmHxV5q5G4= diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go index 31d07e30f..02fde12db 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/acme.go @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ // Package acme provides an implementation of the // Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) spec. // The intial implementation was based on ACME draft-02 and -// is now being extended to comply with RFC8555. +// is now being extended to comply with RFC 8555. // See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-02 // and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555 for details. // @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ import ( const ( // LetsEncryptURL is the Directory endpoint of Let's Encrypt CA. - LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v01.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + LetsEncryptURL = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" // ALPNProto is the ALPN protocol name used by a CA server when validating // tls-alpn-01 challenges. @@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ var idPeACMEIdentifierV1 = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 1, 30, 1} const ( maxChainLen = 5 // max depth and breadth of a certificate chain - maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in bytes + maxCertSize = 1 << 20 // max size of a certificate, in DER bytes + // Used for decoding certs from application/pem-certificate-chain response, + // the default when in RFC mode. + maxCertChainSize = maxCertSize * maxChainLen // Max number of collected nonces kept in memory. // Expect usual peak of 1 or 2. @@ -139,8 +142,7 @@ type Client struct { func (c *Client) accountKID(ctx context.Context) keyID { c.cacheMu.Lock() defer c.cacheMu.Unlock() - if c.dir.OrderURL == "" { - // Assume legacy CA. + if !c.dir.rfcCompliant() { return noKeyID } if c.kid != noKeyID { @@ -233,6 +235,9 @@ func (c *Client) directoryURL() string { } // CreateCert requests a new certificate using the Certificate Signing Request csr encoded in DER format. +// It is incompatible with RFC 8555. Callers should use CreateOrderCert when interfacing +// with an RFC-compliant CA. +// // The exp argument indicates the desired certificate validity duration. CA may issue a certificate // with a different duration. // If the bundle argument is true, the returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate chain. @@ -284,12 +289,22 @@ func (c *Client) CreateCert(ctx context.Context, csr []byte, exp time.Duration, // It retries the request until the certificate is successfully retrieved, // context is cancelled by the caller or an error response is received. // -// The returned value will also contain the CA (issuer) certificate if the bundle argument is true. +// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contains the CA (issuer) +// certificate chain. // // FetchCert returns an error if the CA's response or chain was unreasonably large. // Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid // and has expected features. func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, url, bundle) + } + + // Legacy non-authenticated GET request. res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -304,10 +319,15 @@ func (c *Client) FetchCert(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]by // For instance, the key pair of the certificate may be authorized. // If the key is nil, c.Key is used instead. func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error { - if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { return err } + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + return c.revokeCertRFC(ctx, key, cert, reason) + } + // Legacy CA. body := &struct { Resource string `json:"resource"` Cert string `json:"certificate"` @@ -317,7 +337,7 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert), Reason: int(reason), } - res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + res, err := c.post(ctx, key, dir.RevokeURL, body, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) if err != nil { return err } @@ -337,7 +357,7 @@ func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true } // Register calls prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report // whether the caller agrees to the terms. To always accept the terms, the caller can use AcceptTOS. // -// When interfacing with RFC compliant CA, non-RFC8555 compliant fields of acct are ignored +// When interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA, non-RFC 8555 fields of acct are ignored // and prompt is called if Directory's Terms field is non-zero. // Also see Error's Instance field for when a CA requires already registered accounts to agree // to an updated Terms of Service. @@ -346,9 +366,7 @@ func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL if err != nil { return nil, err } - - // RFC8555 compliant account registration. - if dir.OrderURL != "" { + if dir.rfcCompliant() { return c.registerRFC(ctx, acct, prompt) } @@ -370,16 +388,14 @@ func (c *Client) Register(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL // GetReg retrieves an existing account associated with c.Key. // -// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC8555 CAs. -// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC compliant CA. +// The url argument is an Account URI used with pre-RFC 8555 CAs. +// It is ignored when interfacing with an RFC-compliant CA. func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) { dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } - - // Assume RFC8555 compliant CA. - if dir.OrderURL != "" { + if dir.rfcCompliant() { return c.getRegRFC(ctx) } @@ -395,16 +411,14 @@ func (c *Client) GetReg(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Account, error) { // UpdateReg updates an existing registration. // It returns an updated account copy. The provided account is not modified. // -// When interfacing with RFC compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL +// When interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs, a.URI is ignored and the account URL // associated with c.Key is used instead. func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) { dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } - - // Assume RFC8555 compliant CA. - if dir.OrderURL != "" { + if dir.rfcCompliant() { return c.updateRegRFC(ctx, acct) } @@ -418,13 +432,21 @@ func (c *Client) UpdateReg(ctx context.Context, acct *Account) (*Account, error) return a, nil } -// Authorize performs the initial step in an authorization flow. +// Authorize performs the initial step in the pre-authorization flow, +// as opposed to order-based flow. // The caller will then need to choose from and perform a set of returned // challenges using c.Accept in order to successfully complete authorization. // +// Once complete, the caller can use AuthorizeOrder which the CA +// should provision with the already satisfied authorization. +// For pre-RFC CAs, the caller can proceed directly to requesting a certificate +// using CreateCert method. +// // If an authorization has been previously granted, the CA may return -// a valid authorization (Authorization.Status is StatusValid). If so, the caller -// need not fulfill any challenge and can proceed to requesting a certificate. +// a valid authorization which has its Status field set to StatusValid. +// +// More about pre-authorization can be found at +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.4.1. func (c *Client) Authorize(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*Authorization, error) { return c.authorize(ctx, "dns", domain) } @@ -476,7 +498,17 @@ func (c *Client) authorize(ctx context.Context, typ, val string) (*Authorization // If a caller needs to poll an authorization until its status is final, // see the WaitAuthorization method. func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var res *http.Response + if dir.rfcCompliant() { + res, err = c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + } else { + res, err = c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + } if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -493,8 +525,8 @@ func (c *Client) GetAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizati // The url argument is an Authorization.URI value. // // If successful, the caller will be required to obtain a new authorization -// using the Authorize method before being able to request a new certificate -// for the domain associated with the authorization. +// using the Authorize or AuthorizeOrder methods before being able to request +// a new certificate for the domain associated with the authorization. // // It does not revoke existing certificates. func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { @@ -528,8 +560,18 @@ func (c *Client) RevokeAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) error { // In all other cases WaitAuthorization returns an error. // If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *AuthorizationError. func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorization, error) { + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + getfn := c.postAsGet + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + getfn = c.get + } + for { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -572,10 +614,21 @@ func (c *Client) WaitAuthorization(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Authorizat // // A client typically polls a challenge status using this method. func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, error) { - res, err := c.get(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) + // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + getfn := c.postAsGet + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + getfn = c.get + } + res, err := getfn(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK, http.StatusAccepted)) if err != nil { return nil, err } + defer res.Body.Close() v := wireChallenge{URI: url} if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { @@ -590,23 +643,26 @@ func (c *Client) GetChallenge(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Challenge, erro // The server will then perform the validation asynchronously. func (c *Client) Accept(ctx context.Context, chal *Challenge) (*Challenge, error) { // Required for c.accountKID() when in RFC mode. - if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { - return nil, err - } - - auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token) + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, err } - req := struct { - Resource string `json:"resource"` - Type string `json:"type"` - Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"` - }{ - Resource: "challenge", - Type: chal.Type, - Auth: auth, + var req interface{} = json.RawMessage("{}") // RFC-compliant CA + if !dir.rfcCompliant() { + auth, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), chal.Token) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + req = struct { + Resource string `json:"resource"` + Type string `json:"type"` + Auth string `json:"keyAuthorization"` + }{ + Resource: "challenge", + Type: chal.Type, + Auth: auth, + } } res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, chal.URI, req, wantStatus( http.StatusOK, // according to the spec @@ -658,21 +714,8 @@ func (c *Client) HTTP01ChallengePath(token string) string { } // TLSSNI01ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-01 challenge response. -// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control -// over a domain name. -// -// The implementation is incomplete in that the returned value is a single certificate, -// computed only for Z0 of the key authorization. ACME CAs are expected to update -// their implementations to use the newer version, TLS-SNI-02. -// For more details on TLS-SNI-01 see https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-01#section-7.3. -// -// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. -// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, -// and the public part is used to specify the signee. -// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // -// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name of the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. +// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec. func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { ka, err := keyAuth(c.Key.Public(), token) if err != nil { @@ -689,17 +732,8 @@ func (c *Client) TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tl } // TLSSNI02ChallengeCert creates a certificate for TLS-SNI-02 challenge response. -// Servers can present the certificate to validate the challenge and prove control -// over a domain name. For more details on TLS-SNI-02 see -// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-acme-acme-03#section-7.3. -// -// The token argument is a Challenge.Token value. -// If a WithKey option is provided, its private part signs the returned cert, -// and the public part is used to specify the signee. -// If no WithKey option is provided, a new ECDSA key is generated using P-256 curve. // -// The returned certificate is valid for the next 24 hours and must be presented only when -// the server name in the TLS ClientHello matches exactly the returned name value. +// Deprecated: This challenge type is unused in both draft-02 and RFC versions of ACME spec. func (c *Client) TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(token string, opt ...CertOption) (cert tls.Certificate, name string, err error) { b := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token)) h := hex.EncodeToString(b[:]) @@ -766,7 +800,7 @@ func (c *Client) TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(token, domain string, opt ...CertOption) return tlsChallengeCert([]string{domain}, newOpt) } -// doReg sends all types of registration requests. +// doReg sends all types of registration requests the old way (pre-RFC world). // The type of request is identified by typ argument, which is a "resource" // in the ACME spec terms. // diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go index 5256bc310..2ea9e2317 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ import ( "golang.org/x/net/idna" ) +// DefaultACMEDirectory is the default ACME Directory URL used when the Manager's Client is nil. +const DefaultACMEDirectory = "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory" + // createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state // entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call. // This is a variable instead of a const for testing. @@ -135,9 +138,10 @@ type Manager struct { // Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration // and requesting new certificates. // - // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL - // as directory endpoint. If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is - // generated and, if Cache is not nil, stored in cache. + // If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with DefaultACMEDirectory + // as the directory endpoint. + // If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is generated and, + // if Cache is not nil, stored in cache. // // Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect. Client *acme.Client @@ -174,8 +178,8 @@ type Manager struct { renewalMu sync.Mutex renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal - // tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens. - tokensMu sync.RWMutex + // challengeMu guards tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens. + challengeMu sync.RWMutex // tryHTTP01 indicates whether the Manager should try "http-01" challenge type // during the authorization flow. tryHTTP01 bool @@ -188,6 +192,7 @@ type Manager struct { // and is keyed by the domain name which matches the ClientHello server name. // The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow. certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate + // nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for // testing purposes. nowFunc func() time.Time @@ -267,8 +272,8 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, // Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-ALPN challenge. if wantsTokenCert(hello) { - m.tokensMu.RLock() - defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock() + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil { return cert, nil } @@ -376,8 +381,8 @@ func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool { // If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01" // challenge for domain verification. func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() m.tryHTTP01 = true if fallback == nil { @@ -640,71 +645,64 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) { // authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success. // The key argument is the certificate private key. func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) { - client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) - if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } - - if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { - return nil, nil, err - } csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) + + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - leaf, err = validCert(ck, der, key, m.now()) + dir, err := client.Discover(ctx) if err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - return der, leaf, nil -} -// revokePendingAuthz revokes all authorizations idenfied by the elements of uri slice. -// It ignores revocation errors. -func (m *Manager) revokePendingAuthz(ctx context.Context, uri []string) { - client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) - if err != nil { - return + var chain [][]byte + switch { + // Pre-RFC legacy CA. + case dir.OrderURL == "": + if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + der, _, err := client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + chain = der + // RFC 8555 compliant CA. + default: + o, err := m.verifyRFC(ctx, client, ck.domain) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + der, _, err := client.CreateOrderCert(ctx, o.FinalizeURL, csr, true) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + chain = der } - for _, u := range uri { - client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u) + leaf, err = validCert(ck, chain, key, m.now()) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err } + return chain, leaf, nil } -// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow +// verify runs the identifier (domain) pre-authorization flow for legacy CAs // using each applicable ACME challenge type. func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error { - // The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill - // in this specific order. - challengeTypes := []string{"tls-alpn-01"} - m.tokensMu.RLock() - if m.tryHTTP01 { - challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01") - } - m.tokensMu.RUnlock() - - // Keep track of pending authzs and revoke the ones that did not validate. - pendingAuthzs := make(map[string]bool) + // Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas + // after we're done. + var authzURLs []string defer func() { - var uri []string - for k, pending := range pendingAuthzs { - if pending { - uri = append(uri, k) - } - } - if len(uri) > 0 { - // Use "detached" background context. - // The revocations need not happen in the current verification flow. - go m.revokePendingAuthz(context.Background(), uri) - } + go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(authzURLs) }() // errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error) + challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes() var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try for { // Start domain authorization and get the challenge. @@ -712,6 +710,7 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string if err != nil { return err } + authzURLs = append(authzURLs, authz.URI) // No point in accepting challenges if the authorization status // is in a final state. switch authz.Status { @@ -721,8 +720,6 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI) } - pendingAuthzs[authz.URI] = true - // Pick the next preferred challenge. var chal *acme.Challenge for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { @@ -752,11 +749,126 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string errs[chal] = err continue } - delete(pendingAuthzs, authz.URI) return nil } } +// verifyRFC runs the identifier (domain) order-based authorization flow for RFC compliant CAs +// using each applicable ACME challenge type. +func (m *Manager) verifyRFC(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) (*acme.Order, error) { + // Try each supported challenge type starting with a new order each time. + // The nextTyp index of the next challenge type to try is shared across + // all order authorizations: if we've tried a challenge type once and it didn't work, + // it will most likely not work on another order's authorization either. + challengeTypes := m.supportedChallengeTypes() + nextTyp := 0 // challengeTypes index +AuthorizeOrderLoop: + for { + o, err := client.AuthorizeOrder(ctx, acme.DomainIDs(domain)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Remove all hanging authorizations to reduce rate limit quotas + // after we're done. + defer func(urls []string) { + go m.deactivatePendingAuthz(urls) + }(o.AuthzURLs) + + // Check if there's actually anything we need to do. + switch o.Status { + case acme.StatusReady: + // Already authorized. + return o, nil + case acme.StatusPending: + // Continue normal Order-based flow. + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid new order status %q; order URL: %q", o.Status, o.URI) + } + + // Satisfy all pending authorizations. + for _, zurl := range o.AuthzURLs { + z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, zurl) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if z.Status != acme.StatusPending { + // We are interested only in pending authorizations. + continue + } + // Pick the next preferred challenge. + var chal *acme.Challenge + for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) { + chal = pickChallenge(challengeTypes[nextTyp], z.Challenges) + nextTyp++ + } + if chal == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to satisfy %q for domain %q: no viable challenge type found", z.URI, domain) + } + // Respond to the challenge and wait for validation result. + cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain) + if err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + defer cleanup() + if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, z.URI); err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + } + + // All authorizations are satisfied. + // Wait for the CA to update the order status. + o, err = client.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI) + if err != nil { + continue AuthorizeOrderLoop + } + return o, nil + } +} + +func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge { + for _, c := range chal { + if c.Type == typ { + return c + } + } + return nil +} + +func (m *Manager) supportedChallengeTypes() []string { + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() + typ := []string{"tls-alpn-01"} + if m.tryHTTP01 { + typ = append(typ, "http-01") + } + return typ +} + +// deactivatePendingAuthz relinquishes all authorizations identified by the elements +// of the provided uri slice which are in "pending" state. +// It ignores revocation errors. +// +// deactivatePendingAuthz takes no context argument and instead runs with its own +// "detached" context because deactivations are done in a goroutine separate from +// that of the main issuance or renewal flow. +func (m *Manager) deactivatePendingAuthz(uri []string) { + ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute) + defer cancel() + client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx) + if err != nil { + return + } + for _, u := range uri { + z, err := client.GetAuthorization(ctx, u) + if err == nil && z.Status == acme.StatusPending { + client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u) + } + } +} + // fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal. // The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded. func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) { @@ -780,20 +892,11 @@ func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.C return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type) } -func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge { - for _, c := range chal { - if c.Type == typ { - return c - } - } - return nil -} - // putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name // in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() if m.certTokens == nil { m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate) } @@ -804,8 +907,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certi // deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name // from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache. func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() delete(m.certTokens, name) if m.Cache != nil { ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true} @@ -816,8 +919,8 @@ func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) { // httpToken retrieves an existing http-01 token value from an in-memory map // or the optional cache. func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, error) { - m.tokensMu.RLock() - defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock() + m.challengeMu.RLock() + defer m.challengeMu.RUnlock() if v, ok := m.httpTokens[tokenPath]; ok { return v, nil } @@ -832,8 +935,8 @@ func (m *Manager) httpToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath string) ([]byte, erro // // It ignores any error returned from Cache.Put. func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() if m.httpTokens == nil { m.httpTokens = make(map[string][]byte) } @@ -849,8 +952,8 @@ func (m *Manager) putHTTPToken(ctx context.Context, tokenPath, val string) { // // If m.Cache is non-nil, it blocks until Cache.Delete returns without a timeout. func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) { - m.tokensMu.Lock() - defer m.tokensMu.Unlock() + m.challengeMu.Lock() + defer m.challengeMu.Unlock() delete(m.httpTokens, tokenPath) if m.Cache != nil { m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath)) @@ -949,7 +1052,7 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) { client := m.Client if client == nil { - client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL} + client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: DefaultACMEDirectory} } if client.Key == nil { var err error @@ -967,14 +1070,23 @@ func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) { } a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact} _, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt) - if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict { - // conflict indicates the key is already registered + if err == nil || isAccountAlreadyExist(err) { m.client = client err = nil } return m.client, err } +// isAccountAlreadyExist reports whether the err, as returned from acme.Client.Register, +// indicates the account has already been registered. +func isAccountAlreadyExist(err error) bool { + if err == acme.ErrAccountAlreadyExists { + return true + } + ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error) + return ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict +} + func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy { if m.HostPolicy != nil { return m.HostPolicy diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go index b145292f9..c51943e71 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/http.go @@ -155,6 +155,14 @@ func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Respons } } +// postAsGet is POST-as-GET, a replacement for GET in RFC8555 +// as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3. +// It makes a POST request in KID form with zero JWS payload. +// See nopayload doc comments in jws.go. +func (c *Client) postAsGet(ctx context.Context, url string, ok resOkay) (*http.Response, error) { + return c.post(ctx, nil, url, noPayload, ok) +} + // post issues a signed POST request in JWS format using the provided key // to the specified URL. If key is nil, c.Key is used instead. // It returns a non-error value only when ok reports true. @@ -200,7 +208,7 @@ func (c *Client) post(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, url string, body i // If key argument is nil and c.accountKID returns a non-zero keyID, // the request is sent in KID form. Otherwise, JWK form is used. // -// In practice, when interfacing with RFC compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form +// In practice, when interfacing with RFC-compliant CAs most requests are sent in KID form // and JWK is used only when KID is unavailable: new account endpoint and certificate // revocation requests authenticated by a cert key. // See jwsEncodeJSON for other details. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go index f8bc2c467..cac8b6786 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/jws.go @@ -24,6 +24,12 @@ type keyID string // See jwsEncodeJSON for details. const noKeyID = keyID("") +// noPayload indicates jwsEncodeJSON will encode zero-length octet string +// in a JWS request. This is called POST-as-GET in RFC 8555 and is used to make +// authenticated GET requests via POSTing with an empty payload. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-6.3 for more details. +const noPayload = "" + // jwsEncodeJSON signs claimset using provided key and a nonce. // The result is serialized in JSON format containing either kid or jwk // fields based on the provided keyID value. @@ -50,11 +56,14 @@ func jwsEncodeJSON(claimset interface{}, key crypto.Signer, kid keyID, nonce, ur phead = fmt.Sprintf(`{"alg":%q,"kid":%q,"nonce":%q,"url":%q}`, alg, kid, nonce, url) } phead = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(phead)) - cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset) - if err != nil { - return nil, err + var payload string + if claimset != noPayload { + cs, err := json.Marshal(claimset) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + payload = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs) } - payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cs) hash := sha.New() hash.Write([]byte(phead + "." + payload)) sig, err := jwsSign(key, sha, hash.Sum(nil)) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go index 51839a072..dfb57a66f 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/rfc8555.go @@ -6,16 +6,23 @@ package acme import ( "context" + "crypto" + "encoding/base64" "encoding/json" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" "fmt" + "io" + "io/ioutil" "net/http" + "time" ) // DeactivateReg permanently disables an existing account associated with c.Key. // A deactivated account can no longer request certificate issuance or access // resources related to the account, such as orders or authorizations. // -// It works only with RFC8555 compliant CAs. +// It only works with CAs implementing RFC 8555. func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error { url := string(c.accountKID(ctx)) if url == "" { @@ -30,7 +37,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeactivateReg(ctx context.Context) error { return nil } -// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for RFC-compliant CAs. +// registerRFC is quivalent to c.Register but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. // It expects c.Discover to have already been called. // TODO: Implement externalAccountBinding. func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tosURL string) bool) (*Account, error) { @@ -68,7 +75,7 @@ func (c *Client) registerRFC(ctx context.Context, acct *Account, prompt func(tos return a, nil } -// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for RFC-compliant CAs. +// updateGegRFC is equivalent to c.UpdateReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. // It expects c.Discover to have already been called. func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) { url := string(c.accountKID(ctx)) @@ -88,7 +95,7 @@ func (c *Client) updateRegRFC(ctx context.Context, a *Account) (*Account, error) return responseAccount(res) } -// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for RFC-compliant CAs. +// getGegRFC is equivalent to c.GetReg but for CAs implementing RFC 8555. // It expects c.Discover to have already been called. func (c *Client) getRegRFC(ctx context.Context) (*Account, error) { req := json.RawMessage(`{"onlyReturnExisting": true}`) @@ -111,7 +118,7 @@ func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) { Orders string } if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { - return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid response: %v", err) + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid account response: %v", err) } return &Account{ URI: res.Header.Get("Location"), @@ -120,3 +127,266 @@ func responseAccount(res *http.Response) (*Account, error) { OrdersURL: v.Orders, }, nil } + +// AuthorizeOrder initiates the order-based application for certificate issuance, +// as opposed to pre-authorization in Authorize. +// It is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. +// +// The caller then needs to fetch each authorization with GetAuthorization, +// identify those with StatusPending status and fulfill a challenge using Accept. +// Once all authorizations are satisfied, the caller will typically want to poll +// order status using WaitOrder until it's in StatusReady state. +// To finalize the order and obtain a certificate, the caller submits a CSR with CreateOrderCert. +func (c *Client) AuthorizeOrder(ctx context.Context, id []AuthzID, opt ...OrderOption) (*Order, error) { + dir, err := c.Discover(ctx) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + req := struct { + Identifiers []wireAuthzID `json:"identifiers"` + NotBefore string `json:"notBefore,omitempty"` + NotAfter string `json:"notAfter,omitempty"` + }{} + for _, v := range id { + req.Identifiers = append(req.Identifiers, wireAuthzID{ + Type: v.Type, + Value: v.Value, + }) + } + for _, o := range opt { + switch o := o.(type) { + case orderNotBeforeOpt: + req.NotBefore = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339) + case orderNotAfterOpt: + req.NotAfter = time.Time(o).Format(time.RFC3339) + default: + // Package's fault if we let this happen. + panic(fmt.Sprintf("unsupported order option type %T", o)) + } + } + + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, dir.OrderURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusCreated)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseOrder(res) +} + +// GetOrder retrives an order identified by the given URL. +// For orders created with AuthorizeOrder, the url value is Order.URI. +// +// If a caller needs to poll an order until its status is final, +// see the WaitOrder method. +func (c *Client) GetOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return responseOrder(res) +} + +// WaitOrder polls an order from the given URL until it is in one of the final states, +// StatusReady, StatusValid or StatusInvalid, the CA responded with a non-retryable error +// or the context is done. +// +// It returns a non-nil Order only if its Status is StatusReady or StatusValid. +// In all other cases WaitOrder returns an error. +// If the Status is StatusInvalid, the returned error is of type *OrderError. +func (c *Client) WaitOrder(ctx context.Context, url string) (*Order, error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + for { + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + o, err := responseOrder(res) + res.Body.Close() + switch { + case err != nil: + // Skip and retry. + case o.Status == StatusInvalid: + return nil, &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status} + case o.Status == StatusReady || o.Status == StatusValid: + return o, nil + } + + d := retryAfter(res.Header.Get("Retry-After")) + if d == 0 { + // Default retry-after. + // Same reasoning as in WaitAuthorization. + d = time.Second + } + t := time.NewTimer(d) + select { + case <-ctx.Done(): + t.Stop() + return nil, ctx.Err() + case <-t.C: + // Retry. + } + } +} + +func responseOrder(res *http.Response) (*Order, error) { + var v struct { + Status string + Expires time.Time + Identifiers []wireAuthzID + NotBefore time.Time + NotAfter time.Time + Error *wireError + Authorizations []string + Finalize string + Certificate string + } + if err := json.NewDecoder(res.Body).Decode(&v); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: error reading order: %v", err) + } + o := &Order{ + URI: res.Header.Get("Location"), + Status: v.Status, + Expires: v.Expires, + NotBefore: v.NotBefore, + NotAfter: v.NotAfter, + AuthzURLs: v.Authorizations, + FinalizeURL: v.Finalize, + CertURL: v.Certificate, + } + for _, id := range v.Identifiers { + o.Identifiers = append(o.Identifiers, AuthzID{Type: id.Type, Value: id.Value}) + } + if v.Error != nil { + o.Error = v.Error.error(nil /* headers */) + } + return o, nil +} + +// CreateOrderCert submits the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA at the specified URL. +// The URL is the FinalizeURL field of an Order created with AuthorizeOrder. +// +// If the bundle argument is true, the returned value also contain the CA (issuer) +// certificate chain. Otherwise, only a leaf certificate is returned. +// The returned URL can be used to re-fetch the certificate using FetchCert. +// +// This method is only supported by CAs implementing RFC 8555. See CreateCert for pre-RFC CAs. +// +// CreateOrderCert returns an error if the CA's response is unreasonably large. +// Callers are encouraged to parse the returned value to ensure the certificate is valid and has the expected features. +func (c *Client) CreateOrderCert(ctx context.Context, url string, csr []byte, bundle bool) (der [][]byte, certURL string, err error) { + if _, err := c.Discover(ctx); err != nil { // required by c.accountKID + return nil, "", err + } + + // RFC describes this as "finalize order" request. + req := struct { + CSR string `json:"csr"` + }{ + CSR: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(csr), + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, nil, url, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + o, err := responseOrder(res) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + + // Wait for CA to issue the cert if they haven't. + if o.Status != StatusValid { + o, err = c.WaitOrder(ctx, o.URI) + } + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + // The only acceptable status post finalize and WaitOrder is "valid". + if o.Status != StatusValid { + return nil, "", &OrderError{OrderURL: o.URI, Status: o.Status} + } + crt, err := c.fetchCertRFC(ctx, o.CertURL, bundle) + return crt, o.CertURL, err +} + +// fetchCertRFC downloads issued certificate from the given URL. +// It expects the CA to respond with PEM-encoded certificate chain. +// +// The URL argument is the CertURL field of Order. +func (c *Client) fetchCertRFC(ctx context.Context, url string, bundle bool) ([][]byte, error) { + res, err := c.postAsGet(ctx, url, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + + // Get all the bytes up to a sane maximum. + // Account very roughly for base64 overhead. + const max = maxCertChainSize + maxCertChainSize/33 + b, err := ioutil.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, max+1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: fetch cert response stream: %v", err) + } + if len(b) > max { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too big") + } + + // Decode PEM chain. + var chain [][]byte + for { + var p *pem.Block + p, b = pem.Decode(b) + if p == nil { + break + } + if p.Type != "CERTIFICATE" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme: invalid PEM cert type %q", p.Type) + } + + chain = append(chain, p.Bytes) + if !bundle { + return chain, nil + } + if len(chain) > maxChainLen { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is too long") + } + } + if len(chain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("acme: certificate chain is empty") + } + return chain, nil +} + +// sends a cert revocation request in either JWK form when key is non-nil or KID form otherwise. +func (c *Client) revokeCertRFC(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, cert []byte, reason CRLReasonCode) error { + req := &struct { + Cert string `json:"certificate"` + Reason int `json:"reason"` + }{ + Cert: base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(cert), + Reason: int(reason), + } + res, err := c.post(ctx, key, c.dir.RevokeURL, req, wantStatus(http.StatusOK)) + if err != nil { + if isAlreadyRevoked(err) { + // Assume it is not an error to revoke an already revoked cert. + return nil + } + return err + } + defer res.Body.Close() + return nil +} + +func isAlreadyRevoked(err error) bool { + e, ok := err.(*Error) + return ok && e.ProblemType == "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:alreadyRevoked" +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go index 4432afbc2..9c59097a0 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/types.go @@ -14,12 +14,15 @@ import ( "time" ) -// ACME server response statuses used to describe Authorization and Challenge states. +// ACME status values of Account, Order, Authorization and Challenge objects. +// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555#section-7.1.6 for details. const ( StatusDeactivated = "deactivated" + StatusExpired = "expired" StatusInvalid = "invalid" StatusPending = "pending" StatusProcessing = "processing" + StatusReady = "ready" StatusRevoked = "revoked" StatusUnknown = "unknown" StatusValid = "valid" @@ -102,6 +105,21 @@ func (a *AuthorizationError) Error() string { return fmt.Sprintf("acme: authorization error for %s: %s", a.Identifier, strings.Join(e, "; ")) } +// OrderError is returned from Client's order related methods. +// It indicates the order is unusable and the clients should start over with +// AuthorizeOrder. +// +// The clients can still fetch the order object from CA using GetOrder +// to inspect its state. +type OrderError struct { + OrderURL string + Status string +} + +func (oe *OrderError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("acme: order %s status: %s", oe.OrderURL, oe.Status) +} + // RateLimit reports whether err represents a rate limit error and // any Retry-After duration returned by the server. // @@ -124,11 +142,11 @@ func RateLimit(err error) (time.Duration, bool) { } // Account is a user account. It is associated with a private key. -// Non-RFC8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA. +// Non-RFC 8555 fields are empty when interfacing with a compliant CA. type Account struct { // URI is the account unique ID, which is also a URL used to retrieve // account data from the CA. - // When interfacing with RFC8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field + // When interfacing with RFC 8555-compliant CAs, URI is the "kid" field // value in JWS signed requests. URI string @@ -138,7 +156,7 @@ type Account struct { Contact []string // Status indicates current account status as returned by the CA. - // Possible values are "valid", "deactivated", and "revoked". + // Possible values are StatusValid, StatusDeactivated, and StatusRevoked. Status string // OrdersURL is a URL from which a list of orders submitted by this account @@ -149,32 +167,32 @@ type Account struct { // A value not matching CurrentTerms indicates that the user hasn't agreed // to the actual Terms of Service of the CA. // - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Package users can store the ToS they agree to // during Client's Register call in the prompt callback function. AgreedTerms string // Actual terms of a CA. // - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's Terms field. // When a CA updates their terms and requires an account agreement, // a URL at which instructions to do so is available in Error's Instance field. CurrentTerms string // Authz is the authorization URL used to initiate a new authz flow. // - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant. Use Directory's AuthzURL or OrderURL. Authz string // Authorizations is a URI from which a list of authorizations // granted to this account can be fetched via a GET request. // - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. Authorizations string // Certificates is a URI from which a list of certificates // issued for this account can be fetched via a GET request. // - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrdersURL. Certificates string } @@ -185,11 +203,11 @@ type Directory struct { NonceURL string // RegURL is an account endpoint URL, allowing for creating new accounts. - // Pre-RFC8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL. + // Pre-RFC 8555 CAs also allow modifying existing accounts at this URL. RegURL string // OrderURL is used to initiate the certificate issuance flow - // as described in RFC8555. + // as described in RFC 8555. OrderURL string // AuthzURL is used to initiate identifier pre-authorization flow. @@ -197,7 +215,7 @@ type Directory struct { AuthzURL string // CertURL is a new certificate issuance endpoint URL. - // It is non-RFC8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL. + // It is non-RFC 8555 compliant and is obsoleted by OrderURL. CertURL string // RevokeURL is used to initiate a certificate revocation flow. @@ -223,42 +241,120 @@ type Directory struct { ExternalAccountRequired bool } -// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge. -// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization -// with StatusInvalid. -type Challenge struct { - // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-sni-02", "dns-01". - Type string +// rfcCompliant reports whether the ACME server implements RFC 8555. +// Note that some servers may have incomplete RFC implementation +// even if the returned value is true. +// If rfcCompliant reports false, the server most likely implements draft-02. +func (d *Directory) rfcCompliant() bool { + return d.OrderURL != "" +} - // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to. +// Order represents a client's request for a certificate. +// It tracks the request flow progress through to issuance. +type Order struct { + // URI uniquely identifies an order. URI string - // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. - Token string - - // Status identifies the status of this challenge. + // Status represents the current status of the order. + // It indicates which action the client should take. + // + // Possible values are StatusPending, StatusReady, StatusProcessing, StatusValid and StatusInvalid. + // Pending means the CA does not believe that the client has fulfilled the requirements. + // Ready indicates that the client has fulfilled all the requirements and can submit a CSR + // to obtain a certificate. This is done with Client's CreateOrderCert. + // Processing means the certificate is being issued. + // Valid indicates the CA has issued the certificate. It can be downloaded + // from the Order's CertURL. This is done with Client's FetchCert. + // Invalid means the certificate will not be issued. Users should consider this order + // abandoned. Status string - // Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure - // when this challenge was used. - // The type of a non-nil value is *Error. - Error error + // Expires is the timestamp after which CA considers this order invalid. + Expires time.Time + + // Identifiers contains all identifier objects which the order pertains to. + Identifiers []AuthzID + + // NotBefore is the requested value of the notBefore field in the certificate. + NotBefore time.Time + + // NotAfter is the requested value of the notAfter field in the certificate. + NotAfter time.Time + + // AuthzURLs represents authorizations to complete before a certificate + // for identifiers specified in the order can be issued. + // It also contains unexpired authorizations that the client has completed + // in the past. + // + // Authorization objects can be fetched using Client's GetAuthorization method. + // + // The required authorizations are dictated by CA policies. + // There may not be a 1:1 relationship between the identifiers and required authorizations. + // Required authorizations can be identified by their StatusPending status. + // + // For orders in the StatusValid or StatusInvalid state these are the authorizations + // which were completed. + AuthzURLs []string + + // FinalizeURL is the endpoint at which a CSR is submitted to obtain a certificate + // once all the authorizations are satisfied. + FinalizeURL string + + // CertURL points to the certificate that has been issued in response to this order. + CertURL string + + // The error that occurred while processing the order as received from a CA, if any. + Error *Error +} + +// OrderOption allows customizing Client.AuthorizeOrder call. +type OrderOption interface { + privateOrderOpt() +} + +// WithOrderNotBefore sets order's NotBefore field. +func WithOrderNotBefore(t time.Time) OrderOption { + return orderNotBeforeOpt(t) } +// WithOrderNotAfter sets order's NotAfter field. +func WithOrderNotAfter(t time.Time) OrderOption { + return orderNotAfterOpt(t) +} + +type orderNotBeforeOpt time.Time + +func (orderNotBeforeOpt) privateOrderOpt() {} + +type orderNotAfterOpt time.Time + +func (orderNotAfterOpt) privateOrderOpt() {} + // Authorization encodes an authorization response. type Authorization struct { // URI uniquely identifies a authorization. URI string - // Status identifies the status of an authorization. + // Status is the current status of an authorization. + // Possible values are StatusPending, StatusValid, StatusInvalid, StatusDeactivated, + // StatusExpired and StatusRevoked. Status string // Identifier is what the account is authorized to represent. Identifier AuthzID + // The timestamp after which the CA considers the authorization invalid. + Expires time.Time + + // Wildcard is true for authorizations of a wildcard domain name. + Wildcard bool + // Challenges that the client needs to fulfill in order to prove possession // of the identifier (for pending authorizations). - // For final authorizations, the challenges that were used. + // For valid authorizations, the challenge that was validated. + // For invalid authorizations, the challenge that was attempted and failed. + // + // RFC 8555 compatible CAs require users to fuflfill only one of the challenges. Challenges []*Challenge // A collection of sets of challenges, each of which would be sufficient @@ -266,24 +362,51 @@ type Authorization struct { // Clients must complete a set of challenges that covers at least one set. // Challenges are identified by their indices in the challenges array. // If this field is empty, the client needs to complete all challenges. + // + // This field is unused in RFC 8555. Combinations [][]int } // AuthzID is an identifier that an account is authorized to represent. type AuthzID struct { - Type string // The type of identifier, e.g. "dns". + Type string // The type of identifier, "dns" or "ip". Value string // The identifier itself, e.g. "example.org". } +// DomainIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "dns" identifier type. +func DomainIDs(names ...string) []AuthzID { + a := make([]AuthzID, len(names)) + for i, v := range names { + a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "dns", Value: v} + } + return a +} + +// IPIDs creates a slice of AuthzID with "ip" identifier type. +// Each element of addr is textual form of an address as defined +// in RFC1123 Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in RFC5952 Section 4 for IPv6. +func IPIDs(addr ...string) []AuthzID { + a := make([]AuthzID, len(addr)) + for i, v := range addr { + a[i] = AuthzID{Type: "ip", Value: v} + } + return a +} + +// wireAuthzID is ACME JSON representation of authorization identifier objects. +type wireAuthzID struct { + Type string `json:"type"` + Value string `json:"value"` +} + // wireAuthz is ACME JSON representation of Authorization objects. type wireAuthz struct { + Identifier wireAuthzID Status string + Expires time.Time + Wildcard bool Challenges []wireChallenge Combinations [][]int - Identifier struct { - Type string - Value string - } } func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization { @@ -291,8 +414,10 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) authorization(uri string) *Authorization { URI: uri, Status: z.Status, Identifier: AuthzID{Type: z.Identifier.Type, Value: z.Identifier.Value}, - Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy + Expires: z.Expires, + Wildcard: z.Wildcard, Challenges: make([]*Challenge, len(z.Challenges)), + Combinations: z.Combinations, // shallow copy } for i, v := range z.Challenges { a.Challenges[i] = v.challenge() @@ -313,22 +438,55 @@ func (z *wireAuthz) error(uri string) *AuthorizationError { return err } +// Challenge encodes a returned CA challenge. +// Its Error field may be non-nil if the challenge is part of an Authorization +// with StatusInvalid. +type Challenge struct { + // Type is the challenge type, e.g. "http-01", "tls-alpn-01", "dns-01". + Type string + + // URI is where a challenge response can be posted to. + URI string + + // Token is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. + Token string + + // Status identifies the status of this challenge. + // In RFC 8555, possible values are StatusPending, StatusProcessing, StatusValid, + // and StatusInvalid. + Status string + + // Validated is the time at which the CA validated this challenge. + // Always zero value in pre-RFC 8555. + Validated time.Time + + // Error indicates the reason for an authorization failure + // when this challenge was used. + // The type of a non-nil value is *Error. + Error error +} + // wireChallenge is ACME JSON challenge representation. type wireChallenge struct { - URI string `json:"uri"` - Type string - Token string - Status string - Error *wireError + URL string `json:"url"` // RFC + URI string `json:"uri"` // pre-RFC + Type string + Token string + Status string + Validated time.Time + Error *wireError } func (c *wireChallenge) challenge() *Challenge { v := &Challenge{ - URI: c.URI, + URI: c.URL, Type: c.Type, Token: c.Token, Status: c.Status, } + if v.URI == "" { + v.URI = c.URI // c.URL was empty; use legacy + } if v.Status == "" { v.Status = StatusPending } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87f1e369c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build go1.11 +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s similarity index 100% rename from vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_arm64.s rename to vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..098ec9f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms +// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "math/bits" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // cipher, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of + // this cipher, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 +) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter + // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce. + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 + nonce [3]uint32 + + // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous + // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are + // computed at a time. + buf [bufSize]byte + len int + + // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they + // are computed the first time. + precompDone bool + p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32 + p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32 + p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32 +} + +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given +// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided, +// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce +// have any other length. +// +// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows +// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more +// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism. +// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305. +func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + c := &Cipher{} + return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce) +} + +func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size") + } + if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX { + // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a + // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See + // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3. + key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16]) + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + nonce = cNonce + } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size") + } + + c.key = [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + } + c.nonce = [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]), + } + return c, nil +} + +// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state. +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3 + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k +) + +const blockSize = 64 + +// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words. +// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16 +// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time. +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12) + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + dst = dst[:len(src)] + if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst, src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream. + if s.len != 0 { + keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(keyStream) { + keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)] + } + _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint + for i, b := range keyStream { + dst[i] = src[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(keyStream) + src = src[len(keyStream):] + dst = dst[len(keyStream):] + } + + const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize + numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize + if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } + + // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a + // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a + // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize. + + rem := len(src) % bufSize + full := len(src) - rem + + if full > 0 { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full]) + } + + // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and + // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation. + if rem > 0 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + copy(s.buf[:], src[full:]) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:]) + s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:]) + } +} + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length") + } + + // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state + // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling, + // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13) + // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12). + // + // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc + // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk + // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk + // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn + // + // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + var ( + c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3 + c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3] + c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7] + _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2] + ) + + // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can + // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and + // for future XORKeyStream invocations. + if !s.precompDone { + s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13) + s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14) + s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15) + s.precompDone = true + } + + for i := 0; i < len(src); i += blockSize { + // The remainder of the first column round. + fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter) + + // The second diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14) + + // The remaining 18 rounds. + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + // Column round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + // Finally, add back the initial state to generate the key stream. + x0 += c0 + x1 += c1 + x2 += c2 + x3 += c3 + x4 += c4 + x5 += c5 + x6 += c6 + x7 += c7 + x8 += c8 + x9 += c9 + x10 += c10 + x11 += c11 + x12 += s.counter + x13 += c13 + x14 += c14 + x15 += c15 + + s.counter += 1 + if s.counter == 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow") + } + + in, out := src[i:], dst[i:] + in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint + + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result. + xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0) + xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1) + xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2) + xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3) + xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4) + xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5) + xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6) + xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7) + xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8) + xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9) + xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10) + xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11) + xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12) + xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13) + xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14) + xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15) + } +} + +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes +// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other +// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + out := make([]byte, 32) + return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce) +} + +func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size") + } + if len(nonce) != 16 { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size") + } + + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) + x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16]) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + // Diagonal round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Column round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15) + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec609ed86 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = blockSize + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d0ec61f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..533014ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: +// # ==================================================================== +// # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL +// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and +// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further +// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. +// # ==================================================================== + +// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler +// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on +// the original from openssl. + +// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91 + +// The differences in this and the original implementation are +// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define OUT R3 +#define INP R4 +#define LEN R5 +#define KEY R6 +#define CNT R7 +#define TMP R15 + +#define CONSTBASE R16 +#define BLOCKS R17 + +DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001 +DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004 +DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d +DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405 +DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c +DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704 +DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000 +DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002 +GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0 + +//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40 + MOVD out+0(FP), OUT + MOVD inp+8(FP), INP + MOVD len+16(FP), LEN + MOVD key+24(FP), KEY + MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT + + // Addressing for constants + MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE + MOVD $16, R8 + MOVD $32, R9 + MOVD $48, R10 + MOVD $64, R11 + SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS + // V16 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48 + ADD $80,CONSTBASE + + // Load key into V17,V18 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50 + + // Load CNT, NONCE into V19 + LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51 + + // Clear V27 + VXOR V27, V27, V27 + + // V28 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60 + + // splat slot from V19 -> V26 + VSPLTW $0, V19, V26 + + VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19 + VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19 + + VADDUWM V26, V28, V26 + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + +loop_outer_vsx: + // V0, V1, V2, V3 + LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32 + LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33 + LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34 + LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35 + + // splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11 + VSPLTW $0, V17, V4 + VSPLTW $1, V17, V5 + VSPLTW $2, V17, V6 + VSPLTW $3, V17, V7 + VSPLTW $0, V18, V8 + VSPLTW $1, V18, V9 + VSPLTW $2, V18, V10 + VSPLTW $3, V18, V11 + + // VOR + VOR V26, V26, V12 + + // splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15 + VSPLTW $1, V19, V13 + VSPLTW $2, V19, V14 + VSPLTW $3, V19, V15 + + // splat const values + VSPLTISW $-16, V27 + VSPLTISW $12, V28 + VSPLTISW $8, V29 + VSPLTISW $7, V30 + +loop_vsx: + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + BC 16, LT, loop_vsx + + VADDUWM V12, V26, V12 + + WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27 + WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28 + + WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0 + WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2 + + WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29 + WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33 + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34 + + WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4 + WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6 + + WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27 + WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28 + + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37 + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38 + + WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8 + WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10 + + WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29 + WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41 + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42 + + WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12 + WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14 + + VSPLTISW $4, V27 + VADDUWM V26, V27, V26 + + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45 + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46 + + VADDUWM V0, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V4, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V8, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V12, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + // Bottom of loop + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V1, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V5, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V9, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V13, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V2, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V6, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V10, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V14, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V3, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V7, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V11, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V15, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + BNE loop_outer_vsx + +done_vsx: + // Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks + MOVD (CNT), R14 + ADD BLOCKS, R14 + MOVD R14, (CNT) + RET + +tail_vsx: + ADD $32, R1, R11 + MOVD LEN, CTR + + // Save values on stack to copy from + STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10) + ADD $-1, R11, R12 + ADD $-1, INP + ADD $-1, OUT + +looptail_vsx: + // Copying the result to OUT + // in bytes. + MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY + MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP + XOR KEY, TMP, KEY + MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT) + BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx + + // Clear the stack values + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10) + BR done_vsx diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cd55f45a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX + +const bufSize = 256 + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) + } else { + c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s similarity index 87% rename from vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s rename to vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s index 57df40446..de52a2ea8 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine +// +build !gccgo,!appengine #include "go_asm.h" #include "textflag.h" @@ -24,15 +24,6 @@ DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 -// EXRL targets: -TEXT ·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0 - MVC $1, (R1), (R8) - RET - -TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0 - MVC $1, (R8), (R9) - RET - #define BSWAP V5 #define J0 V6 #define KEY0 V7 @@ -144,7 +135,7 @@ TEXT ·mvcBufToDst(SB), NOFRAME|NOSPLIT, $0 VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} -// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int) +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] @@ -152,25 +143,10 @@ TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter - MOVD buf+72(FP), R8 // R8=buf - MOVD len+80(FP), R9 // R9=len // load BSWAP and J0 VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 - // set up tail buffer - ADD $-1, R4, R12 - MOVBZ R12, R12 - CMPUBEQ R12, $255, aligned - MOVD R4, R1 - AND $~255, R1 - MOVD $(R3)(R1*1), R1 - EXRL $·mvcSrcToBuf(SB), R12 - MOVD $255, R0 - SUB R12, R0 - MOVD R0, (R9) // update len - -aligned: // setup MOVD $95, R0 VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 @@ -217,9 +193,7 @@ loop: // decrement length ADD $-256, R4 - BLT tail -continue: // rearrange vectors SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) @@ -245,16 +219,6 @@ continue: MOVD $256(R3), R3 CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha - CMPUBEQ R12, $255, return - EXRL $·mvcBufToDst(SB), R12 // len was updated during setup -return: VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) RET - -tail: - MOVD R2, R9 - MOVD R8, R2 - MOVD R8, R3 - MOVD $0, R4 - JMP continue diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go similarity index 98% rename from vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go rename to vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go index 9c5ba0b33..0110c9865 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/xor.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go @@ -4,9 +4,7 @@ package chacha20 -import ( - "runtime" -) +import "runtime" // Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.h b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.h deleted file mode 100644 index b3f74162f..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public -// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html - -#define REDMASK51 0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s deleted file mode 100644 index ee7b4bd5f..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/const_amd64.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,20 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public -// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html - -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine - -// These constants cannot be encoded in non-MOVQ immediates. -// We access them directly from memory instead. - -DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872 -GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8 - -DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA -GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8 - -DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE -GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s deleted file mode 100644 index cd793a5b5..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/cswap_amd64.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine - -// func cswap(inout *[4][5]uint64, v uint64) -TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0 - MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI - MOVQ v+8(FP),SI - - SUBQ $1, SI - NOTQ SI - MOVQ SI, X15 - PSHUFD $0x44, X15, X15 - - MOVOU 0(DI), X0 - MOVOU 16(DI), X2 - MOVOU 32(DI), X4 - MOVOU 48(DI), X6 - MOVOU 64(DI), X8 - MOVOU 80(DI), X1 - MOVOU 96(DI), X3 - MOVOU 112(DI), X5 - MOVOU 128(DI), X7 - MOVOU 144(DI), X9 - - MOVO X1, X10 - MOVO X3, X11 - MOVO X5, X12 - MOVO X7, X13 - MOVO X9, X14 - - PXOR X0, X10 - PXOR X2, X11 - PXOR X4, X12 - PXOR X6, X13 - PXOR X8, X14 - PAND X15, X10 - PAND X15, X11 - PAND X15, X12 - PAND X15, X13 - PAND X15, X14 - PXOR X10, X0 - PXOR X10, X1 - PXOR X11, X2 - PXOR X11, X3 - PXOR X12, X4 - PXOR X12, X5 - PXOR X13, X6 - PXOR X13, X7 - PXOR X14, X8 - PXOR X14, X9 - - MOVOU X0, 0(DI) - MOVOU X2, 16(DI) - MOVOU X4, 32(DI) - MOVOU X6, 48(DI) - MOVOU X8, 64(DI) - MOVOU X1, 80(DI) - MOVOU X3, 96(DI) - MOVOU X5, 112(DI) - MOVOU X7, 128(DI) - MOVOU X9, 144(DI) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go index 75f24babb..4b9a655d1 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go @@ -1,834 +1,95 @@ -// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -// We have an implementation in amd64 assembly so this code is only run on -// non-amd64 platforms. The amd64 assembly does not support gccgo. -// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine - -package curve25519 +// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which +// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519. +// See RFC 7748. +package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" import ( - "encoding/binary" + "crypto/subtle" + "fmt" ) -// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of -// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein. - -// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element -// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77 -// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on -// context. -type fieldElement [10]int32 - -func feZero(fe *fieldElement) { - for i := range fe { - fe[i] = 0 - } -} - -func feOne(fe *fieldElement) { - feZero(fe) - fe[0] = 1 -} - -func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { - for i := range dst { - dst[i] = a[i] + b[i] - } -} - -func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { - for i := range dst { - dst[i] = a[i] - b[i] - } -} - -func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) { - for i := range dst { - dst[i] = src[i] - } -} - -// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0. -// -// Preconditions: b in {0,1}. -func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) { - b = -b - for i := range f { - t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i]) - f[i] ^= t - g[i] ^= t - } -} - -// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in. -func load3(in []byte) int64 { - var r int64 - r = int64(in[0]) - r |= int64(in[1]) << 8 - r |= int64(in[2]) << 16 - return r -} - -// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in. -func load4(in []byte) int64 { - return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in)) -} - -func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) { - h0 := load4(src[:]) - h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6 - h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5 - h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3 - h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2 - h5 := load4(src[16:]) - h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7 - h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5 - h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4 - h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2 - - var carry [10]int64 - carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25 - h0 += carry[9] * 19 - h9 -= carry[9] << 25 - carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25 - h2 += carry[1] - h1 -= carry[1] << 25 - carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25 - h4 += carry[3] - h3 -= carry[3] << 25 - carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25 - h6 += carry[5] - h5 -= carry[5] << 25 - carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25 - h8 += carry[7] - h7 -= carry[7] << 25 - - carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 - carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26 - h3 += carry[2] - h2 -= carry[2] << 26 - carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26 - h7 += carry[6] - h6 -= carry[6] << 26 - carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26 - h9 += carry[8] - h8 -= carry[8] << 26 - - dst[0] = int32(h0) - dst[1] = int32(h1) - dst[2] = int32(h2) - dst[3] = int32(h3) - dst[4] = int32(h4) - dst[5] = int32(h5) - dst[6] = int32(h6) - dst[7] = int32(h7) - dst[8] = int32(h8) - dst[9] = int32(h9) -} - -// feToBytes marshals h to s. -// Preconditions: -// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. -// -// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p). -// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))). -// -// Proof: -// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4. -// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4. -// -// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9). -// Then 0> 25 - q = (h[0] + q) >> 26 - q = (h[1] + q) >> 25 - q = (h[2] + q) >> 26 - q = (h[3] + q) >> 25 - q = (h[4] + q) >> 26 - q = (h[5] + q) >> 25 - q = (h[6] + q) >> 26 - q = (h[7] + q) >> 25 - q = (h[8] + q) >> 26 - q = (h[9] + q) >> 25 - - // Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. - h[0] += 19 * q - // Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. - - carry[0] = h[0] >> 26 - h[1] += carry[0] - h[0] -= carry[0] << 26 - carry[1] = h[1] >> 25 - h[2] += carry[1] - h[1] -= carry[1] << 25 - carry[2] = h[2] >> 26 - h[3] += carry[2] - h[2] -= carry[2] << 26 - carry[3] = h[3] >> 25 - h[4] += carry[3] - h[3] -= carry[3] << 25 - carry[4] = h[4] >> 26 - h[5] += carry[4] - h[4] -= carry[4] << 26 - carry[5] = h[5] >> 25 - h[6] += carry[5] - h[5] -= carry[5] << 25 - carry[6] = h[6] >> 26 - h[7] += carry[6] - h[6] -= carry[6] << 26 - carry[7] = h[7] >> 25 - h[8] += carry[7] - h[7] -= carry[7] << 25 - carry[8] = h[8] >> 26 - h[9] += carry[8] - h[8] -= carry[8] << 26 - carry[9] = h[9] >> 25 - h[9] -= carry[9] << 25 - // h10 = carry9 - - // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. - // Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1; - // evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0. - // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9]. - - s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0) - s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8) - s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16) - s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2)) - s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6) - s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14) - s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3)) - s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5) - s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13) - s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5)) - s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3) - s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11) - s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6)) - s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2) - s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10) - s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18) - s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0) - s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8) - s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16) - s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1)) - s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7) - s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15) - s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3)) - s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5) - s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13) - s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4)) - s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4) - s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12) - s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6)) - s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2) - s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10) - s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18) +// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all +// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which +// will return an error. +func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + scalarMult(dst, scalar, point) } -// feMul calculates h = f * g -// Can overlap h with f or g. -// -// Preconditions: -// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. -// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. -// -// Postconditions: -// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. -// -// Notes on implementation strategy: -// -// Using schoolbook multiplication. -// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models. +// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the +// standard generator. // -// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations; -// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations. -// -// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain; -// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this, -// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean. -// -// There are 12 carries below. -// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable. -// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper. -// -// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. -func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) { - f0 := f[0] - f1 := f[1] - f2 := f[2] - f3 := f[3] - f4 := f[4] - f5 := f[5] - f6 := f[6] - f7 := f[7] - f8 := f[8] - f9 := f[9] - g0 := g[0] - g1 := g[1] - g2 := g[2] - g3 := g[3] - g4 := g[4] - g5 := g[5] - g6 := g[6] - g7 := g[7] - g8 := g[8] - g9 := g[9] - g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29 - g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok - g3_19 := 19 * g3 - g4_19 := 19 * g4 - g5_19 := 19 * g5 - g6_19 := 19 * g6 - g7_19 := 19 * g7 - g8_19 := 19 * g8 - g9_19 := 19 * g9 - f1_2 := 2 * f1 - f3_2 := 2 * f3 - f5_2 := 2 * f5 - f7_2 := 2 * f7 - f9_2 := 2 * f9 - f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0) - f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1) - f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2) - f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3) - f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4) - f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5) - f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6) - f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7) - f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8) - f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9) - f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0) - f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1) - f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2) - f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3) - f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4) - f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5) - f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6) - f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7) - f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8) - f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19) - f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0) - f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1) - f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2) - f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3) - f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4) - f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5) - f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6) - f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7) - f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19) - f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19) - f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0) - f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1) - f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2) - f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3) - f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4) - f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5) - f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6) - f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19) - f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19) - f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19) - f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0) - f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1) - f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2) - f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3) - f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4) - f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5) - f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19) - f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19) - f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19) - f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19) - f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0) - f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1) - f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2) - f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3) - f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4) - f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19) - f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19) - f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19) - f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19) - f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19) - f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0) - f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1) - f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2) - f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3) - f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19) - f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19) - f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19) - f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19) - f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19) - f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19) - f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0) - f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1) - f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2) - f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19) - f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19) - f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19) - f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19) - f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19) - f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19) - f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19) - f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0) - f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1) - f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19) - f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19) - f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19) - f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19) - f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19) - f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19) - f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19) - f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19) - f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0) - f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19) - f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19) - f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19) - f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19) - f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19) - f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19) - f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19) - f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19) - f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19) - h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38 - h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19 - h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38 - h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19 - h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38 - h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19 - h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38 - h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19 - h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38 - h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0 - var carry [10]int64 - - // |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38)) - // i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8 - // |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19)) - // i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 - - carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 - carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - // |h0| <= 2^25 - // |h4| <= 2^25 - // |h1| <= 1.51*2^58 - // |h5| <= 1.51*2^58 - - carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h2 += carry[1] - h1 -= carry[1] << 25 - carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h6 += carry[5] - h5 -= carry[5] << 25 - // |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 - // |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 - // |h2| <= 1.21*2^59 - // |h6| <= 1.21*2^59 - - carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h3 += carry[2] - h2 -= carry[2] << 26 - carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h7 += carry[6] - h6 -= carry[6] << 26 - // |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h3| <= 1.51*2^58 - // |h7| <= 1.51*2^58 - - carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h4 += carry[3] - h3 -= carry[3] << 25 - carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h8 += carry[7] - h7 -= carry[7] << 25 - // |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h4| <= 1.52*2^33 - // |h8| <= 1.52*2^33 - - carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h9 += carry[8] - h8 -= carry[8] << 26 - // |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 - // |h9| <= 1.51*2^58 - - carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h0 += carry[9] * 19 - h9 -= carry[9] << 25 - // |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h0| <= 1.8*2^37 - - carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 - // |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged - // |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 - - h[0] = int32(h0) - h[1] = int32(h1) - h[2] = int32(h2) - h[3] = int32(h3) - h[4] = int32(h4) - h[5] = int32(h5) - h[6] = int32(h6) - h[7] = int32(h7) - h[8] = int32(h8) - h[9] = int32(h9) +// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as +// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs. +func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + ScalarMult(dst, scalar, &basePoint) } -// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f. -// -// Preconditions: -// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. -// -// Postconditions: -// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. -func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) { - f0 := f[0] - f1 := f[1] - f2 := f[2] - f3 := f[3] - f4 := f[4] - f5 := f[5] - f6 := f[6] - f7 := f[7] - f8 := f[8] - f9 := f[9] - f0_2 := 2 * f0 - f1_2 := 2 * f1 - f2_2 := 2 * f2 - f3_2 := 2 * f3 - f4_2 := 2 * f4 - f5_2 := 2 * f5 - f6_2 := 2 * f6 - f7_2 := 2 * f7 - f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30 - f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30 - f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30 - f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30 - f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30 - f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0) - f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1) - f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2) - f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3) - f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4) - f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5) - f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6) - f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7) - f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8) - f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9) - f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1) - f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2) - f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2) - f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4) - f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2) - f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6) - f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2) - f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8) - f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38) - f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2) - f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3) - f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4) - f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5) - f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6) - f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7) - f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19) - f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38) - f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3) - f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4) - f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2) - f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6) - f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38) - f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19) - f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38) - f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4) - f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5) - f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19) - f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38) - f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19) - f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38) - f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38) - f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19) - f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38) - f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19) - f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38) - f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19) - f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38) - f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19) - f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38) - f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38) - f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19) - f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38) - f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19) - f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38) - f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38) - h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38 - h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38 - h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19 - h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38 - h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38 - h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38 - h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19 - h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38 - h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38 - h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2 - var carry [10]int64 - - carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 - carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - - carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h2 += carry[1] - h1 -= carry[1] << 25 - carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h6 += carry[5] - h5 -= carry[5] << 25 - - carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h3 += carry[2] - h2 -= carry[2] << 26 - carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h7 += carry[6] - h6 -= carry[6] << 26 - - carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h4 += carry[3] - h3 -= carry[3] << 25 - carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h8 += carry[7] - h7 -= carry[7] << 25 +const ( + // ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519. + ScalarSize = 32 + // PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519. + PointSize = 32 +) - carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h9 += carry[8] - h8 -= carry[8] << 26 +// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator. +var Basepoint []byte - carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h0 += carry[9] * 19 - h9 -= carry[9] << 25 +var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} - carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 +func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] } - h[0] = int32(h0) - h[1] = int32(h1) - h[2] = int32(h2) - h[3] = int32(h3) - h[4] = int32(h4) - h[5] = int32(h5) - h[6] = int32(h6) - h[7] = int32(h7) - h[8] = int32(h8) - h[9] = int32(h9) +func checkBasepoint() { + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(Basepoint, []byte{ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + }) != 1 { + panic("curve25519: global Basepoint value was modified") + } } -// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f. +// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point), +// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are +// slices of 32 bytes. // -// Preconditions: -// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should +// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call. // -// Postconditions: -// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. -func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) { - h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666 - h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666 - h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666 - h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666 - h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666 - h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666 - h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666 - h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666 - h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666 - h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666 - var carry [10]int64 - - carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h0 += carry[9] * 19 - h9 -= carry[9] << 25 - carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h2 += carry[1] - h1 -= carry[1] << 25 - carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h4 += carry[3] - h3 -= carry[3] << 25 - carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h6 += carry[5] - h5 -= carry[5] << 25 - carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 - h8 += carry[7] - h7 -= carry[7] << 25 - - carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h1 += carry[0] - h0 -= carry[0] << 26 - carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h3 += carry[2] - h2 -= carry[2] << 26 - carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h5 += carry[4] - h4 -= carry[4] << 26 - carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h7 += carry[6] - h6 -= carry[6] << 26 - carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 - h9 += carry[8] - h8 -= carry[8] << 26 - - h[0] = int32(h0) - h[1] = int32(h1) - h[2] = int32(h2) - h[3] = int32(h3) - h[4] = int32(h4) - h[5] = int32(h5) - h[6] = int32(h6) - h[7] = int32(h7) - h[8] = int32(h8) - h[9] = int32(h9) -} - -// feInvert sets out = z^-1. -func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) { - var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement - var i int - - feSquare(&t0, z) - for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { - feSquare(&t0, &t0) - } - feSquare(&t1, &t0) - for i = 1; i < 2; i++ { - feSquare(&t1, &t1) - } - feMul(&t1, z, &t1) - feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1) - feSquare(&t2, &t0) - for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2) - feSquare(&t2, &t1) - for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) - feSquare(&t2, &t1) - for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) - feSquare(&t3, &t2) - for i = 1; i < 20; i++ { - feSquare(&t3, &t3) - } - feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) - feSquare(&t2, &t1) - for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) - feSquare(&t3, &t2) - for i = 1; i < 100; i++ { - feSquare(&t3, &t3) - } - feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { - feSquare(&t2, &t2) - } - feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) - feSquare(&t1, &t1) - for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { - feSquare(&t1, &t1) - } - feMul(out, &t1, &t0) +// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same +// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance. +func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the + // caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap. + var dst [32]byte + return x25519(&dst, scalar, point) } -func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) { - var e [32]byte - - copy(e[:], in[:]) - e[0] &= 248 - e[31] &= 127 - e[31] |= 64 - - var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement - feFromBytes(&x1, base) - feOne(&x2) - feCopy(&x3, &x1) - feOne(&z3) - - swap := int32(0) - for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- { - b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7) - b &= 1 - swap ^= int32(b) - feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) - feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) - swap = int32(b) - - feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3) - feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2) - feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2) - feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3) - feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2) - feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1) - feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1) - feSquare(&tmp1, &x2) - feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2) - feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2) - feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0) - feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0) - feSquare(&z2, &z2) - feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1) - feSquare(&x3, &x3) - feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3) - feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2) - feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0) - } - - feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) - feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) - - feInvert(&z2, &z2) - feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2) - feToBytes(out, &x2) +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var in [32]byte + if l := len(scalar); l != 32 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad scalar length: %d, expected %d", l, 32) + } + if l := len(point); l != 32 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad point length: %d, expected %d", l, 32) + } + copy(in[:], scalar) + if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] { + checkBasepoint() + ScalarBaseMult(dst, &in) + } else { + var base, zero [32]byte + copy(base[:], point) + ScalarMult(dst, &in, &base) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad input point: low order point") + } + } + return dst[:], nil } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mont25519_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go similarity index 99% rename from vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mont25519_amd64.go rename to vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go index 5822bd533..5120b779b 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mont25519_amd64.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego package curve25519 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/ladderstep_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s similarity index 76% rename from vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/ladderstep_amd64.s rename to vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s index e0ac30c70..0250c8885 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/ladderstep_amd64.s +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s @@ -5,9 +5,84 @@ // This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public // domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego -#include "const_amd64.h" +#define REDMASK51 0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF + +// These constants cannot be encoded in non-MOVQ immediates. +// We access them directly from memory instead. + +DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872 +GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8 + +DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA +GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8 + +DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE +GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8 + +// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$0-8 + MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI + + MOVQ 0(DI),SI + MOVQ 8(DI),DX + MOVQ 16(DI),CX + MOVQ 24(DI),R8 + MOVQ 32(DI),R9 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,AX + MOVQ AX,R10 + SUBQ $18,R10 + MOVQ $3,R11 +REDUCELOOP: + MOVQ SI,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,SI + ADDQ R12,DX + MOVQ DX,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,DX + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,CX + ADDQ R12,R8 + MOVQ R8,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,R8 + ADDQ R12,R9 + MOVQ R9,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,R9 + IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12 + ADDQ R12,SI + SUBQ $1,R11 + JA REDUCELOOP + MOVQ $1,R12 + CMPQ R10,SI + CMOVQLT R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,DX + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,CX + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,R8 + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,R9 + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + NEGQ R12 + ANDQ R12,AX + ANDQ R12,R10 + SUBQ R10,SI + SUBQ AX,DX + SUBQ AX,CX + SUBQ AX,R8 + SUBQ AX,R9 + MOVQ SI,0(DI) + MOVQ DX,8(DI) + MOVQ CX,16(DI) + MOVQ R8,24(DI) + MOVQ R9,32(DI) + RET // func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64) TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8 @@ -1375,3 +1450,344 @@ TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8 MOVQ AX,104(DI) MOVQ R10,112(DI) RET + +// func cswap(inout *[4][5]uint64, v uint64) +TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0 + MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI + MOVQ v+8(FP),SI + + SUBQ $1, SI + NOTQ SI + MOVQ SI, X15 + PSHUFD $0x44, X15, X15 + + MOVOU 0(DI), X0 + MOVOU 16(DI), X2 + MOVOU 32(DI), X4 + MOVOU 48(DI), X6 + MOVOU 64(DI), X8 + MOVOU 80(DI), X1 + MOVOU 96(DI), X3 + MOVOU 112(DI), X5 + MOVOU 128(DI), X7 + MOVOU 144(DI), X9 + + MOVO X1, X10 + MOVO X3, X11 + MOVO X5, X12 + MOVO X7, X13 + MOVO X9, X14 + + PXOR X0, X10 + PXOR X2, X11 + PXOR X4, X12 + PXOR X6, X13 + PXOR X8, X14 + PAND X15, X10 + PAND X15, X11 + PAND X15, X12 + PAND X15, X13 + PAND X15, X14 + PXOR X10, X0 + PXOR X10, X1 + PXOR X11, X2 + PXOR X11, X3 + PXOR X12, X4 + PXOR X12, X5 + PXOR X13, X6 + PXOR X13, X7 + PXOR X14, X8 + PXOR X14, X9 + + MOVOU X0, 0(DI) + MOVOU X2, 16(DI) + MOVOU X4, 32(DI) + MOVOU X6, 48(DI) + MOVOU X8, 64(DI) + MOVOU X1, 80(DI) + MOVOU X3, 96(DI) + MOVOU X5, 112(DI) + MOVOU X7, 128(DI) + MOVOU X9, 144(DI) + RET + +// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24 + MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI + MOVQ a+8(FP), SI + MOVQ b+16(FP), DX + + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,0(SP) + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 32(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,8(SP) + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + MOVQ AX,BX + MOVQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 24(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 24(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 32(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ SI,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ SI,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ SI,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ SI,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + SHLQ $13,BX,BP + ANDQ SI,BX + ADDQ R15,BX + IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX + ADDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ R8,DX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R10,DX + MOVQ DX,CX + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,R8 + ADDQ R12,DX + MOVQ DX,R9 + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,CX + ADDQ R14,DX + MOVQ DX,AX + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,R9 + ADDQ BX,DX + MOVQ DX,R10 + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,AX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX + ADDQ DX,R8 + ANDQ SI,R10 + MOVQ R8,0(DI) + MOVQ CX,8(DI) + MOVQ R9,16(DI) + MOVQ AX,24(DI) + MOVQ R10,32(DI) + RET + +// func square(out, in *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16 + MOVQ out+0(FP), DI + MOVQ in+8(FP), SI + + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 0(SI) + MOVQ AX,CX + MOVQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 8(SI) + MOVQ AX,R9 + MOVQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SI) + MOVQ AX,R11 + MOVQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + MOVQ AX,R13 + MOVQ DX,R14 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + MOVQ AX,R15 + MOVQ DX,BX + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 8(SI) + ADDQ AX,R11 + ADCQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SI) + ADDQ AX,R13 + ADCQ DX,R14 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,R15 + ADCQ DX,BX + MOVQ 8(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,CX + ADCQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 16(SI) + ADDQ AX,R15 + ADCQ DX,BX + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,CX + ADCQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R9 + ADCQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,R9 + ADCQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R11 + ADCQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 32(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R13 + ADCQ DX,R14 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI + SHLQ $13,CX,R8 + ANDQ SI,CX + SHLQ $13,R9,R10 + ANDQ SI,R9 + ADDQ R8,R9 + SHLQ $13,R11,R12 + ANDQ SI,R11 + ADDQ R10,R11 + SHLQ $13,R13,R14 + ANDQ SI,R13 + ADDQ R12,R13 + SHLQ $13,R15,BX + ANDQ SI,R15 + ADDQ R14,R15 + IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX + ADDQ DX,CX + MOVQ CX,DX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R9,DX + ANDQ SI,CX + MOVQ DX,R8 + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R11,DX + ANDQ SI,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R13,DX + ANDQ SI,R9 + MOVQ DX,AX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R15,DX + ANDQ SI,AX + MOVQ DX,R10 + SHRQ $51,DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX + ADDQ DX,CX + ANDQ SI,R10 + MOVQ CX,0(DI) + MOVQ R8,8(DI) + MOVQ R9,16(DI) + MOVQ AX,24(DI) + MOVQ R10,32(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c43b13fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,828 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package curve25519 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of +// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein. + +// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element +// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77 +// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on +// context. +type fieldElement [10]int32 + +func feZero(fe *fieldElement) { + for i := range fe { + fe[i] = 0 + } +} + +func feOne(fe *fieldElement) { + feZero(fe) + fe[0] = 1 +} + +func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = a[i] + b[i] + } +} + +func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = a[i] - b[i] + } +} + +func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = src[i] + } +} + +// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0. +// +// Preconditions: b in {0,1}. +func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) { + b = -b + for i := range f { + t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i]) + f[i] ^= t + g[i] ^= t + } +} + +// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in. +func load3(in []byte) int64 { + var r int64 + r = int64(in[0]) + r |= int64(in[1]) << 8 + r |= int64(in[2]) << 16 + return r +} + +// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in. +func load4(in []byte) int64 { + return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in)) +} + +func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) { + h0 := load4(src[:]) + h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6 + h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5 + h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3 + h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2 + h5 := load4(src[16:]) + h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7 + h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5 + h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4 + h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2 + + var carry [10]int64 + carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + dst[0] = int32(h0) + dst[1] = int32(h1) + dst[2] = int32(h2) + dst[3] = int32(h3) + dst[4] = int32(h4) + dst[5] = int32(h5) + dst[6] = int32(h6) + dst[7] = int32(h7) + dst[8] = int32(h8) + dst[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feToBytes marshals h to s. +// Preconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +// +// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p). +// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))). +// +// Proof: +// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4. +// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4. +// +// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9). +// Then 0> 25 + q = (h[0] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[1] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[2] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[3] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[4] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[5] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[6] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[7] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[8] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[9] + q) >> 25 + + // Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + h[0] += 19 * q + // Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + + carry[0] = h[0] >> 26 + h[1] += carry[0] + h[0] -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[1] = h[1] >> 25 + h[2] += carry[1] + h[1] -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[2] = h[2] >> 26 + h[3] += carry[2] + h[2] -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[3] = h[3] >> 25 + h[4] += carry[3] + h[3] -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[4] = h[4] >> 26 + h[5] += carry[4] + h[4] -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[5] = h[5] >> 25 + h[6] += carry[5] + h[5] -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[6] = h[6] >> 26 + h[7] += carry[6] + h[6] -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[7] = h[7] >> 25 + h[8] += carry[7] + h[7] -= carry[7] << 25 + carry[8] = h[8] >> 26 + h[9] += carry[8] + h[8] -= carry[8] << 26 + carry[9] = h[9] >> 25 + h[9] -= carry[9] << 25 + // h10 = carry9 + + // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + // Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1; + // evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0. + // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9]. + + s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0) + s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8) + s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16) + s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2)) + s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6) + s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14) + s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3)) + s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5) + s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13) + s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5)) + s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3) + s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11) + s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6)) + s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2) + s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10) + s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18) + s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0) + s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8) + s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16) + s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1)) + s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7) + s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15) + s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3)) + s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5) + s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13) + s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4)) + s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4) + s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12) + s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6)) + s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2) + s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10) + s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18) +} + +// feMul calculates h = f * g +// Can overlap h with f or g. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +// +// Notes on implementation strategy: +// +// Using schoolbook multiplication. +// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models. +// +// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations; +// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations. +// +// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain; +// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this, +// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean. +// +// There are 12 carries below. +// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable. +// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper. +// +// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. +func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) { + f0 := f[0] + f1 := f[1] + f2 := f[2] + f3 := f[3] + f4 := f[4] + f5 := f[5] + f6 := f[6] + f7 := f[7] + f8 := f[8] + f9 := f[9] + g0 := g[0] + g1 := g[1] + g2 := g[2] + g3 := g[3] + g4 := g[4] + g5 := g[5] + g6 := g[6] + g7 := g[7] + g8 := g[8] + g9 := g[9] + g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29 + g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok + g3_19 := 19 * g3 + g4_19 := 19 * g4 + g5_19 := 19 * g5 + g6_19 := 19 * g6 + g7_19 := 19 * g7 + g8_19 := 19 * g8 + g9_19 := 19 * g9 + f1_2 := 2 * f1 + f3_2 := 2 * f3 + f5_2 := 2 * f5 + f7_2 := 2 * f7 + f9_2 := 2 * f9 + f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0) + f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1) + f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2) + f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3) + f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4) + f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5) + f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6) + f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7) + f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8) + f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9) + f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0) + f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1) + f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2) + f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3) + f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4) + f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5) + f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6) + f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7) + f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8) + f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19) + f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0) + f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1) + f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2) + f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3) + f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4) + f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5) + f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6) + f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7) + f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19) + f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19) + f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0) + f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1) + f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2) + f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3) + f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4) + f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5) + f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6) + f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19) + f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19) + f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19) + f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0) + f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1) + f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2) + f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3) + f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4) + f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5) + f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19) + f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19) + f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19) + f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19) + f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0) + f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1) + f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2) + f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3) + f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4) + f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19) + f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19) + f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19) + f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19) + f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19) + f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0) + f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1) + f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2) + f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3) + f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19) + f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19) + f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19) + f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19) + f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19) + f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19) + f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0) + f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1) + f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2) + f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19) + f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19) + f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19) + f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19) + f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19) + f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19) + f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19) + f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0) + f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1) + f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19) + f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19) + f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19) + f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19) + f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19) + f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19) + f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19) + f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19) + f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0) + f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19) + f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19) + f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19) + f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19) + f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19) + f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19) + f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19) + f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19) + f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19) + h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38 + h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19 + h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38 + h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19 + h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38 + h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19 + h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38 + h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19 + h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38 + h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0 + var carry [10]int64 + + // |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38)) + // i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8 + // |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19)) + // i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + // |h0| <= 2^25 + // |h4| <= 2^25 + // |h1| <= 1.51*2^58 + // |h5| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + // |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 + // |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 + // |h2| <= 1.21*2^59 + // |h6| <= 1.21*2^59 + + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + // |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h3| <= 1.51*2^58 + // |h7| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + // |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h4| <= 1.52*2^33 + // |h8| <= 1.52*2^33 + + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + // |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 + // |h9| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + // |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h0| <= 1.8*2^37 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + // |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) { + f0 := f[0] + f1 := f[1] + f2 := f[2] + f3 := f[3] + f4 := f[4] + f5 := f[5] + f6 := f[6] + f7 := f[7] + f8 := f[8] + f9 := f[9] + f0_2 := 2 * f0 + f1_2 := 2 * f1 + f2_2 := 2 * f2 + f3_2 := 2 * f3 + f4_2 := 2 * f4 + f5_2 := 2 * f5 + f6_2 := 2 * f6 + f7_2 := 2 * f7 + f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30 + f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30 + f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30 + f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30 + f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30 + f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0) + f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1) + f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2) + f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3) + f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4) + f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5) + f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6) + f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7) + f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8) + f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9) + f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1) + f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2) + f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2) + f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4) + f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2) + f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6) + f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2) + f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8) + f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38) + f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2) + f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3) + f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4) + f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5) + f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6) + f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7) + f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19) + f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38) + f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3) + f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4) + f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2) + f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6) + f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38) + f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19) + f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38) + f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4) + f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5) + f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19) + f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38) + f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19) + f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38) + f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38) + f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19) + f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38) + f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19) + f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38) + f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19) + f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38) + f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19) + f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38) + f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38) + f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19) + f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38) + f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19) + f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38) + f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38) + h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38 + h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38 + h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19 + h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38 + h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38 + h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38 + h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19 + h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38 + h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38 + h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2 + var carry [10]int64 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) { + h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666 + h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666 + h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666 + h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666 + h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666 + h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666 + h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666 + h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666 + h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666 + h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666 + var carry [10]int64 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feInvert sets out = z^-1. +func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) { + var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement + var i int + + feSquare(&t0, z) + for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { + feSquare(&t0, &t0) + } + feSquare(&t1, &t0) + for i = 1; i < 2; i++ { + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + } + feMul(&t1, z, &t1) + feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t0) + for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t3, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 20; i++ { + feSquare(&t3, &t3) + } + feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t3, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 100; i++ { + feSquare(&t3, &t3) + } + feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + } + feMul(out, &t1, &t0) +} + +func scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base *[32]byte) { + var e [32]byte + + copy(e[:], in[:]) + e[0] &= 248 + e[31] &= 127 + e[31] |= 64 + + var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement + feFromBytes(&x1, base) + feOne(&x2) + feCopy(&x3, &x1) + feOne(&z3) + + swap := int32(0) + for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- { + b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7) + b &= 1 + swap ^= int32(b) + feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) + feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) + swap = int32(b) + + feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3) + feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2) + feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2) + feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3) + feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2) + feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1) + feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1) + feSquare(&tmp1, &x2) + feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2) + feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2) + feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0) + feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0) + feSquare(&z2, &z2) + feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1) + feSquare(&x3, &x3) + feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3) + feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2) + feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0) + } + + feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) + feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) + + feInvert(&z2, &z2) + feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2) + feToBytes(out, &x2) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..047d49afc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine purego + +package curve25519 + +func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) { + scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/doc.go deleted file mode 100644 index da9b10d9c..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/doc.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of scalar multiplication on -// the elliptic curve known as curve25519. See https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html -package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" - -// basePoint is the x coordinate of the generator of the curve. -var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} - -// ScalarMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x -// coordinates of group points and all values are in little-endian form. -func ScalarMult(dst, in, base *[32]byte) { - scalarMult(dst, in, base) -} - -// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product in*base where dst and base are the x -// coordinates of group points, base is the standard generator and all values -// are in little-endian form. -func ScalarBaseMult(dst, in *[32]byte) { - ScalarMult(dst, in, &basePoint) -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s deleted file mode 100644 index 390816106..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/freeze_amd64.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,73 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public -// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html - -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine - -#include "const_amd64.h" - -// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64) -TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$0-8 - MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI - - MOVQ 0(DI),SI - MOVQ 8(DI),DX - MOVQ 16(DI),CX - MOVQ 24(DI),R8 - MOVQ 32(DI),R9 - MOVQ $REDMASK51,AX - MOVQ AX,R10 - SUBQ $18,R10 - MOVQ $3,R11 -REDUCELOOP: - MOVQ SI,R12 - SHRQ $51,R12 - ANDQ AX,SI - ADDQ R12,DX - MOVQ DX,R12 - SHRQ $51,R12 - ANDQ AX,DX - ADDQ R12,CX - MOVQ CX,R12 - SHRQ $51,R12 - ANDQ AX,CX - ADDQ R12,R8 - MOVQ R8,R12 - SHRQ $51,R12 - ANDQ AX,R8 - ADDQ R12,R9 - MOVQ R9,R12 - SHRQ $51,R12 - ANDQ AX,R9 - IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12 - ADDQ R12,SI - SUBQ $1,R11 - JA REDUCELOOP - MOVQ $1,R12 - CMPQ R10,SI - CMOVQLT R11,R12 - CMPQ AX,DX - CMOVQNE R11,R12 - CMPQ AX,CX - CMOVQNE R11,R12 - CMPQ AX,R8 - CMOVQNE R11,R12 - CMPQ AX,R9 - CMOVQNE R11,R12 - NEGQ R12 - ANDQ R12,AX - ANDQ R12,R10 - SUBQ R10,SI - SUBQ AX,DX - SUBQ AX,CX - SUBQ AX,R8 - SUBQ AX,R9 - MOVQ SI,0(DI) - MOVQ DX,8(DI) - MOVQ CX,16(DI) - MOVQ R8,24(DI) - MOVQ R9,32(DI) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s deleted file mode 100644 index 1f76d1a3f..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/mul_amd64.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,169 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public -// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html - -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine - -#include "const_amd64.h" - -// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64) -TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24 - MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI - MOVQ a+8(FP), SI - MOVQ b+16(FP), DX - - MOVQ DX,CX - MOVQ 24(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MOVQ AX,0(SP) - MULQ 16(CX) - MOVQ AX,R8 - MOVQ DX,R9 - MOVQ 32(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MOVQ AX,8(SP) - MULQ 8(CX) - ADDQ AX,R8 - ADCQ DX,R9 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 0(CX) - ADDQ AX,R8 - ADCQ DX,R9 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 8(CX) - MOVQ AX,R10 - MOVQ DX,R11 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 16(CX) - MOVQ AX,R12 - MOVQ DX,R13 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 24(CX) - MOVQ AX,R14 - MOVQ DX,R15 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 32(CX) - MOVQ AX,BX - MOVQ DX,BP - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - MULQ 0(CX) - ADDQ AX,R10 - ADCQ DX,R11 - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - MULQ 8(CX) - ADDQ AX,R12 - ADCQ DX,R13 - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - MULQ 16(CX) - ADDQ AX,R14 - ADCQ DX,R15 - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - MULQ 24(CX) - ADDQ AX,BX - ADCQ DX,BP - MOVQ 8(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MULQ 32(CX) - ADDQ AX,R8 - ADCQ DX,R9 - MOVQ 16(SI),AX - MULQ 0(CX) - ADDQ AX,R12 - ADCQ DX,R13 - MOVQ 16(SI),AX - MULQ 8(CX) - ADDQ AX,R14 - ADCQ DX,R15 - MOVQ 16(SI),AX - MULQ 16(CX) - ADDQ AX,BX - ADCQ DX,BP - MOVQ 16(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MULQ 24(CX) - ADDQ AX,R8 - ADCQ DX,R9 - MOVQ 16(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MULQ 32(CX) - ADDQ AX,R10 - ADCQ DX,R11 - MOVQ 24(SI),AX - MULQ 0(CX) - ADDQ AX,R14 - ADCQ DX,R15 - MOVQ 24(SI),AX - MULQ 8(CX) - ADDQ AX,BX - ADCQ DX,BP - MOVQ 0(SP),AX - MULQ 24(CX) - ADDQ AX,R10 - ADCQ DX,R11 - MOVQ 0(SP),AX - MULQ 32(CX) - ADDQ AX,R12 - ADCQ DX,R13 - MOVQ 32(SI),AX - MULQ 0(CX) - ADDQ AX,BX - ADCQ DX,BP - MOVQ 8(SP),AX - MULQ 16(CX) - ADDQ AX,R10 - ADCQ DX,R11 - MOVQ 8(SP),AX - MULQ 24(CX) - ADDQ AX,R12 - ADCQ DX,R13 - MOVQ 8(SP),AX - MULQ 32(CX) - ADDQ AX,R14 - ADCQ DX,R15 - MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI - SHLQ $13,R8,R9 - ANDQ SI,R8 - SHLQ $13,R10,R11 - ANDQ SI,R10 - ADDQ R9,R10 - SHLQ $13,R12,R13 - ANDQ SI,R12 - ADDQ R11,R12 - SHLQ $13,R14,R15 - ANDQ SI,R14 - ADDQ R13,R14 - SHLQ $13,BX,BP - ANDQ SI,BX - ADDQ R15,BX - IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX - ADDQ DX,R8 - MOVQ R8,DX - SHRQ $51,DX - ADDQ R10,DX - MOVQ DX,CX - SHRQ $51,DX - ANDQ SI,R8 - ADDQ R12,DX - MOVQ DX,R9 - SHRQ $51,DX - ANDQ SI,CX - ADDQ R14,DX - MOVQ DX,AX - SHRQ $51,DX - ANDQ SI,R9 - ADDQ BX,DX - MOVQ DX,R10 - SHRQ $51,DX - ANDQ SI,AX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX - ADDQ DX,R8 - ANDQ SI,R10 - MOVQ R8,0(DI) - MOVQ CX,8(DI) - MOVQ R9,16(DI) - MOVQ AX,24(DI) - MOVQ R10,32(DI) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s deleted file mode 100644 index 07511a45a..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/square_amd64.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,132 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public -// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html - -// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine - -#include "const_amd64.h" - -// func square(out, in *[5]uint64) -TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16 - MOVQ out+0(FP), DI - MOVQ in+8(FP), SI - - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - MULQ 0(SI) - MOVQ AX,CX - MOVQ DX,R8 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 8(SI) - MOVQ AX,R9 - MOVQ DX,R10 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 16(SI) - MOVQ AX,R11 - MOVQ DX,R12 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 24(SI) - MOVQ AX,R13 - MOVQ DX,R14 - MOVQ 0(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 32(SI) - MOVQ AX,R15 - MOVQ DX,BX - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - MULQ 8(SI) - ADDQ AX,R11 - ADCQ DX,R12 - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 16(SI) - ADDQ AX,R13 - ADCQ DX,R14 - MOVQ 8(SI),AX - SHLQ $1,AX - MULQ 24(SI) - ADDQ AX,R15 - ADCQ DX,BX - MOVQ 8(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX - MULQ 32(SI) - ADDQ AX,CX - ADCQ DX,R8 - MOVQ 16(SI),AX - MULQ 16(SI) - ADDQ AX,R15 - ADCQ DX,BX - MOVQ 16(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX - MULQ 24(SI) - ADDQ AX,CX - ADCQ DX,R8 - MOVQ 16(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX - MULQ 32(SI) - ADDQ AX,R9 - ADCQ DX,R10 - MOVQ 24(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MULQ 24(SI) - ADDQ AX,R9 - ADCQ DX,R10 - MOVQ 24(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX - MULQ 32(SI) - ADDQ AX,R11 - ADCQ DX,R12 - MOVQ 32(SI),DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX - MULQ 32(SI) - ADDQ AX,R13 - ADCQ DX,R14 - MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI - SHLQ $13,CX,R8 - ANDQ SI,CX - SHLQ $13,R9,R10 - ANDQ SI,R9 - ADDQ R8,R9 - SHLQ $13,R11,R12 - ANDQ SI,R11 - ADDQ R10,R11 - SHLQ $13,R13,R14 - ANDQ SI,R13 - ADDQ R12,R13 - SHLQ $13,R15,BX - ANDQ SI,R15 - ADDQ R14,R15 - IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX - ADDQ DX,CX - MOVQ CX,DX - SHRQ $51,DX - ADDQ R9,DX - ANDQ SI,CX - MOVQ DX,R8 - SHRQ $51,DX - ADDQ R11,DX - ANDQ SI,R8 - MOVQ DX,R9 - SHRQ $51,DX - ADDQ R13,DX - ANDQ SI,R9 - MOVQ DX,AX - SHRQ $51,DX - ADDQ R15,DX - ANDQ SI,AX - MOVQ DX,R10 - SHRQ $51,DX - IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX - ADDQ DX,CX - ANDQ SI,R10 - MOVQ CX,0(DI) - MOVQ R8,8(DI) - MOVQ R9,16(DI) - MOVQ AX,24(DI) - MOVQ R10,32(DI) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_ppc64le.s deleted file mode 100644 index cde3fc989..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/asm_ppc64le.s +++ /dev/null @@ -1,668 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: -// # ==================================================================== -// # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL -// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and -// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further -// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. -// # ==================================================================== - -// Original code can be found at the link below: -// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91e5c39ca79126a4a876d5d8ff - -// There are some differences between CRYPTOGAMS code and this one. The round -// loop for "_int" isn't the same as the original. Some adjustments were -// necessary because there are less vector registers available. For example, some -// X variables (r12, r13, r14, and r15) share the same register used by the -// counter. The original code uses ctr to name the counter. Here we use CNT -// because golang uses CTR as the counter register name. - -// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine - -#include "textflag.h" - -#define OUT R3 -#define INP R4 -#define LEN R5 -#define KEY R6 -#define CNT R7 - -#define TEMP R8 - -#define X0 R11 -#define X1 R12 -#define X2 R14 -#define X3 R15 -#define X4 R16 -#define X5 R17 -#define X6 R18 -#define X7 R19 -#define X8 R20 -#define X9 R21 -#define X10 R22 -#define X11 R23 -#define X12 R24 -#define X13 R25 -#define X14 R26 -#define X15 R27 - -#define CON0 X0 -#define CON1 X1 -#define CON2 X2 -#define CON3 X3 - -#define KEY0 X4 -#define KEY1 X5 -#define KEY2 X6 -#define KEY3 X7 -#define KEY4 X8 -#define KEY5 X9 -#define KEY6 X10 -#define KEY7 X11 - -#define CNT0 X12 -#define CNT1 X13 -#define CNT2 X14 -#define CNT3 X15 - -#define TMP0 R9 -#define TMP1 R10 -#define TMP2 R28 -#define TMP3 R29 - -#define CONSTS R8 - -#define A0 V0 -#define B0 V1 -#define C0 V2 -#define D0 V3 -#define A1 V4 -#define B1 V5 -#define C1 V6 -#define D1 V7 -#define A2 V8 -#define B2 V9 -#define C2 V10 -#define D2 V11 -#define T0 V12 -#define T1 V13 -#define T2 V14 - -#define K0 V15 -#define K1 V16 -#define K2 V17 -#define K3 V18 -#define K4 V19 -#define K5 V20 - -#define FOUR V21 -#define SIXTEEN V22 -#define TWENTY4 V23 -#define TWENTY V24 -#define TWELVE V25 -#define TWENTY5 V26 -#define SEVEN V27 - -#define INPPERM V28 -#define OUTPERM V29 -#define OUTMASK V30 - -#define DD0 V31 -#define DD1 SEVEN -#define DD2 T0 -#define DD3 T1 -#define DD4 T2 - -DATA ·consts+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865 -DATA ·consts+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32 -DATA ·consts+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001 -DATA ·consts+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 -DATA ·consts+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004 -DATA ·consts+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 -DATA ·consts+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d -DATA ·consts+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405 -DATA ·consts+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c -DATA ·consts+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704 -GLOBL ·consts(SB), RODATA, $80 - -//func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[32]byte, counter *[16]byte) -TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(SB),NOSPLIT|NOFRAME,$0 - // Load the arguments inside the registers - MOVD out+0(FP), OUT - MOVD inp+8(FP), INP - MOVD len+16(FP), LEN - MOVD key+24(FP), KEY - MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT - - MOVD $·consts(SB), CONSTS // point to consts addr - - MOVD $16, X0 - MOVD $32, X1 - MOVD $48, X2 - MOVD $64, X3 - MOVD $31, X4 - MOVD $15, X5 - - // Load key - LVX (KEY)(R0), K1 - LVSR (KEY)(R0), T0 - LVX (KEY)(X0), K2 - LVX (KEY)(X4), DD0 - - // Load counter - LVX (CNT)(R0), K3 - LVSR (CNT)(R0), T1 - LVX (CNT)(X5), DD1 - - // Load constants - LVX (CONSTS)(R0), K0 - LVX (CONSTS)(X0), K5 - LVX (CONSTS)(X1), FOUR - LVX (CONSTS)(X2), SIXTEEN - LVX (CONSTS)(X3), TWENTY4 - - // Align key and counter - VPERM K2, K1, T0, K1 - VPERM DD0, K2, T0, K2 - VPERM DD1, K3, T1, K3 - - // Load counter to GPR - MOVWZ 0(CNT), CNT0 - MOVWZ 4(CNT), CNT1 - MOVWZ 8(CNT), CNT2 - MOVWZ 12(CNT), CNT3 - - // Adjust vectors for the initial state - VADDUWM K3, K5, K3 - VADDUWM K3, K5, K4 - VADDUWM K4, K5, K5 - - // Synthesized constants - VSPLTISW $-12, TWENTY - VSPLTISW $12, TWELVE - VSPLTISW $-7, TWENTY5 - - VXOR T0, T0, T0 - VSPLTISW $-1, OUTMASK - LVSR (INP)(R0), INPPERM - LVSL (OUT)(R0), OUTPERM - VPERM OUTMASK, T0, OUTPERM, OUTMASK - -loop_outer_vmx: - // Load constant - MOVD $0x61707865, CON0 - MOVD $0x3320646e, CON1 - MOVD $0x79622d32, CON2 - MOVD $0x6b206574, CON3 - - VOR K0, K0, A0 - VOR K0, K0, A1 - VOR K0, K0, A2 - VOR K1, K1, B0 - - MOVD $10, TEMP - - // Load key to GPR - MOVWZ 0(KEY), X4 - MOVWZ 4(KEY), X5 - MOVWZ 8(KEY), X6 - MOVWZ 12(KEY), X7 - VOR K1, K1, B1 - VOR K1, K1, B2 - MOVWZ 16(KEY), X8 - MOVWZ 0(CNT), X12 - MOVWZ 20(KEY), X9 - MOVWZ 4(CNT), X13 - VOR K2, K2, C0 - VOR K2, K2, C1 - MOVWZ 24(KEY), X10 - MOVWZ 8(CNT), X14 - VOR K2, K2, C2 - VOR K3, K3, D0 - MOVWZ 28(KEY), X11 - MOVWZ 12(CNT), X15 - VOR K4, K4, D1 - VOR K5, K5, D2 - - MOVD X4, TMP0 - MOVD X5, TMP1 - MOVD X6, TMP2 - MOVD X7, TMP3 - VSPLTISW $7, SEVEN - - MOVD TEMP, CTR - -loop_vmx: - // CRYPTOGAMS uses a macro to create a loop using perl. This isn't possible - // using assembly macros. Therefore, the macro expansion result was used - // in order to maintain the algorithm efficiency. - // This loop generates three keystream blocks using VMX instructions and, - // in parallel, one keystream block using scalar instructions. - ADD X4, X0, X0 - ADD X5, X1, X1 - VADDUWM A0, B0, A0 - VADDUWM A1, B1, A1 - ADD X6, X2, X2 - ADD X7, X3, X3 - VADDUWM A2, B2, A2 - VXOR D0, A0, D0 - XOR X0, X12, X12 - XOR X1, X13, X13 - VXOR D1, A1, D1 - VXOR D2, A2, D2 - XOR X2, X14, X14 - XOR X3, X15, X15 - VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0 - VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1 - ROTLW $16, X12, X12 - ROTLW $16, X13, X13 - VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2 - VADDUWM C0, D0, C0 - ROTLW $16, X14, X14 - ROTLW $16, X15, X15 - VADDUWM C1, D1, C1 - VADDUWM C2, D2, C2 - ADD X12, X8, X8 - ADD X13, X9, X9 - VXOR B0, C0, T0 - VXOR B1, C1, T1 - ADD X14, X10, X10 - ADD X15, X11, X11 - VXOR B2, C2, T2 - VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0 - XOR X8, X4, X4 - XOR X9, X5, X5 - VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1 - VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2 - XOR X10, X6, X6 - XOR X11, X7, X7 - VADDUWM A0, B0, A0 - VADDUWM A1, B1, A1 - ROTLW $12, X4, X4 - ROTLW $12, X5, X5 - VADDUWM A2, B2, A2 - VXOR D0, A0, D0 - ROTLW $12, X6, X6 - ROTLW $12, X7, X7 - VXOR D1, A1, D1 - VXOR D2, A2, D2 - ADD X4, X0, X0 - ADD X5, X1, X1 - VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0 - VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1 - ADD X6, X2, X2 - ADD X7, X3, X3 - VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2 - VADDUWM C0, D0, C0 - XOR X0, X12, X12 - XOR X1, X13, X13 - VADDUWM C1, D1, C1 - VADDUWM C2, D2, C2 - XOR X2, X14, X14 - XOR X3, X15, X15 - VXOR B0, C0, T0 - VXOR B1, C1, T1 - ROTLW $8, X12, X12 - ROTLW $8, X13, X13 - VXOR B2, C2, T2 - VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0 - ROTLW $8, X14, X14 - ROTLW $8, X15, X15 - VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1 - VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2 - ADD X12, X8, X8 - ADD X13, X9, X9 - VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0 - VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1 - ADD X14, X10, X10 - ADD X15, X11, X11 - VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2 - VSLDOI $12, B0, B0, B0 - XOR X8, X4, X4 - XOR X9, X5, X5 - VSLDOI $12, B1, B1, B1 - VSLDOI $12, B2, B2, B2 - XOR X10, X6, X6 - XOR X11, X7, X7 - VSLDOI $4, D0, D0, D0 - VSLDOI $4, D1, D1, D1 - ROTLW $7, X4, X4 - ROTLW $7, X5, X5 - VSLDOI $4, D2, D2, D2 - VADDUWM A0, B0, A0 - ROTLW $7, X6, X6 - ROTLW $7, X7, X7 - VADDUWM A1, B1, A1 - VADDUWM A2, B2, A2 - ADD X5, X0, X0 - ADD X6, X1, X1 - VXOR D0, A0, D0 - VXOR D1, A1, D1 - ADD X7, X2, X2 - ADD X4, X3, X3 - VXOR D2, A2, D2 - VPERM D0, D0, SIXTEEN, D0 - XOR X0, X15, X15 - XOR X1, X12, X12 - VPERM D1, D1, SIXTEEN, D1 - VPERM D2, D2, SIXTEEN, D2 - XOR X2, X13, X13 - XOR X3, X14, X14 - VADDUWM C0, D0, C0 - VADDUWM C1, D1, C1 - ROTLW $16, X15, X15 - ROTLW $16, X12, X12 - VADDUWM C2, D2, C2 - VXOR B0, C0, T0 - ROTLW $16, X13, X13 - ROTLW $16, X14, X14 - VXOR B1, C1, T1 - VXOR B2, C2, T2 - ADD X15, X10, X10 - ADD X12, X11, X11 - VRLW T0, TWELVE, B0 - VRLW T1, TWELVE, B1 - ADD X13, X8, X8 - ADD X14, X9, X9 - VRLW T2, TWELVE, B2 - VADDUWM A0, B0, A0 - XOR X10, X5, X5 - XOR X11, X6, X6 - VADDUWM A1, B1, A1 - VADDUWM A2, B2, A2 - XOR X8, X7, X7 - XOR X9, X4, X4 - VXOR D0, A0, D0 - VXOR D1, A1, D1 - ROTLW $12, X5, X5 - ROTLW $12, X6, X6 - VXOR D2, A2, D2 - VPERM D0, D0, TWENTY4, D0 - ROTLW $12, X7, X7 - ROTLW $12, X4, X4 - VPERM D1, D1, TWENTY4, D1 - VPERM D2, D2, TWENTY4, D2 - ADD X5, X0, X0 - ADD X6, X1, X1 - VADDUWM C0, D0, C0 - VADDUWM C1, D1, C1 - ADD X7, X2, X2 - ADD X4, X3, X3 - VADDUWM C2, D2, C2 - VXOR B0, C0, T0 - XOR X0, X15, X15 - XOR X1, X12, X12 - VXOR B1, C1, T1 - VXOR B2, C2, T2 - XOR X2, X13, X13 - XOR X3, X14, X14 - VRLW T0, SEVEN, B0 - VRLW T1, SEVEN, B1 - ROTLW $8, X15, X15 - ROTLW $8, X12, X12 - VRLW T2, SEVEN, B2 - VSLDOI $8, C0, C0, C0 - ROTLW $8, X13, X13 - ROTLW $8, X14, X14 - VSLDOI $8, C1, C1, C1 - VSLDOI $8, C2, C2, C2 - ADD X15, X10, X10 - ADD X12, X11, X11 - VSLDOI $4, B0, B0, B0 - VSLDOI $4, B1, B1, B1 - ADD X13, X8, X8 - ADD X14, X9, X9 - VSLDOI $4, B2, B2, B2 - VSLDOI $12, D0, D0, D0 - XOR X10, X5, X5 - XOR X11, X6, X6 - VSLDOI $12, D1, D1, D1 - VSLDOI $12, D2, D2, D2 - XOR X8, X7, X7 - XOR X9, X4, X4 - ROTLW $7, X5, X5 - ROTLW $7, X6, X6 - ROTLW $7, X7, X7 - ROTLW $7, X4, X4 - BC 0x10, 0, loop_vmx - - SUB $256, LEN, LEN - - // Accumulate key block - ADD $0x61707865, X0, X0 - ADD $0x3320646e, X1, X1 - ADD $0x79622d32, X2, X2 - ADD $0x6b206574, X3, X3 - ADD TMP0, X4, X4 - ADD TMP1, X5, X5 - ADD TMP2, X6, X6 - ADD TMP3, X7, X7 - MOVWZ 16(KEY), TMP0 - MOVWZ 20(KEY), TMP1 - MOVWZ 24(KEY), TMP2 - MOVWZ 28(KEY), TMP3 - ADD TMP0, X8, X8 - ADD TMP1, X9, X9 - ADD TMP2, X10, X10 - ADD TMP3, X11, X11 - - MOVWZ 12(CNT), TMP0 - MOVWZ 8(CNT), TMP1 - MOVWZ 4(CNT), TMP2 - MOVWZ 0(CNT), TEMP - ADD TMP0, X15, X15 - ADD TMP1, X14, X14 - ADD TMP2, X13, X13 - ADD TEMP, X12, X12 - - // Accumulate key block - VADDUWM A0, K0, A0 - VADDUWM A1, K0, A1 - VADDUWM A2, K0, A2 - VADDUWM B0, K1, B0 - VADDUWM B1, K1, B1 - VADDUWM B2, K1, B2 - VADDUWM C0, K2, C0 - VADDUWM C1, K2, C1 - VADDUWM C2, K2, C2 - VADDUWM D0, K3, D0 - VADDUWM D1, K4, D1 - VADDUWM D2, K5, D2 - - // Increment counter - ADD $4, TEMP, TEMP - MOVW TEMP, 0(CNT) - - VADDUWM K3, FOUR, K3 - VADDUWM K4, FOUR, K4 - VADDUWM K5, FOUR, K5 - - // XOR the input slice (INP) with the keystream, which is stored in GPRs (X0-X3). - - // Load input (aligned or not) - MOVWZ 0(INP), TMP0 - MOVWZ 4(INP), TMP1 - MOVWZ 8(INP), TMP2 - MOVWZ 12(INP), TMP3 - - // XOR with input - XOR TMP0, X0, X0 - XOR TMP1, X1, X1 - XOR TMP2, X2, X2 - XOR TMP3, X3, X3 - MOVWZ 16(INP), TMP0 - MOVWZ 20(INP), TMP1 - MOVWZ 24(INP), TMP2 - MOVWZ 28(INP), TMP3 - XOR TMP0, X4, X4 - XOR TMP1, X5, X5 - XOR TMP2, X6, X6 - XOR TMP3, X7, X7 - MOVWZ 32(INP), TMP0 - MOVWZ 36(INP), TMP1 - MOVWZ 40(INP), TMP2 - MOVWZ 44(INP), TMP3 - XOR TMP0, X8, X8 - XOR TMP1, X9, X9 - XOR TMP2, X10, X10 - XOR TMP3, X11, X11 - MOVWZ 48(INP), TMP0 - MOVWZ 52(INP), TMP1 - MOVWZ 56(INP), TMP2 - MOVWZ 60(INP), TMP3 - XOR TMP0, X12, X12 - XOR TMP1, X13, X13 - XOR TMP2, X14, X14 - XOR TMP3, X15, X15 - - // Store output (aligned or not) - MOVW X0, 0(OUT) - MOVW X1, 4(OUT) - MOVW X2, 8(OUT) - MOVW X3, 12(OUT) - - ADD $64, INP, INP // INP points to the end of the slice for the alignment code below - - MOVW X4, 16(OUT) - MOVD $16, TMP0 - MOVW X5, 20(OUT) - MOVD $32, TMP1 - MOVW X6, 24(OUT) - MOVD $48, TMP2 - MOVW X7, 28(OUT) - MOVD $64, TMP3 - MOVW X8, 32(OUT) - MOVW X9, 36(OUT) - MOVW X10, 40(OUT) - MOVW X11, 44(OUT) - MOVW X12, 48(OUT) - MOVW X13, 52(OUT) - MOVW X14, 56(OUT) - MOVW X15, 60(OUT) - ADD $64, OUT, OUT - - // Load input - LVX (INP)(R0), DD0 - LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 - LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2 - LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3 - LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4 - ADD $64, INP, INP - - VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align input - VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1 - VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2 - VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3 - VXOR A0, DD0, A0 // XOR with input - VXOR B0, DD1, B0 - LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading input - VXOR C0, DD2, C0 - LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2 - VXOR D0, DD3, D0 - LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3 - LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD0 - ADD $64, INP, INP - MOVD $63, TMP3 // 63 is not a typo - VPERM A0, A0, OUTPERM, A0 - VPERM B0, B0, OUTPERM, B0 - VPERM C0, C0, OUTPERM, C0 - VPERM D0, D0, OUTPERM, D0 - - VPERM DD1, DD4, INPPERM, DD4 // Align input - VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1 - VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2 - VPERM DD0, DD3, INPPERM, DD3 - VXOR A1, DD4, A1 - VXOR B1, DD1, B1 - LVX (INP)(TMP0), DD1 // Keep loading - VXOR C1, DD2, C1 - LVX (INP)(TMP1), DD2 - VXOR D1, DD3, D1 - LVX (INP)(TMP2), DD3 - - // Note that the LVX address is always rounded down to the nearest 16-byte - // boundary, and that it always points to at most 15 bytes beyond the end of - // the slice, so we cannot cross a page boundary. - LVX (INP)(TMP3), DD4 // Redundant in aligned case. - ADD $64, INP, INP - VPERM A1, A1, OUTPERM, A1 // Pre-misalign output - VPERM B1, B1, OUTPERM, B1 - VPERM C1, C1, OUTPERM, C1 - VPERM D1, D1, OUTPERM, D1 - - VPERM DD1, DD0, INPPERM, DD0 // Align Input - VPERM DD2, DD1, INPPERM, DD1 - VPERM DD3, DD2, INPPERM, DD2 - VPERM DD4, DD3, INPPERM, DD3 - VXOR A2, DD0, A2 - VXOR B2, DD1, B2 - VXOR C2, DD2, C2 - VXOR D2, DD3, D2 - VPERM A2, A2, OUTPERM, A2 - VPERM B2, B2, OUTPERM, B2 - VPERM C2, C2, OUTPERM, C2 - VPERM D2, D2, OUTPERM, D2 - - ANDCC $15, OUT, X1 // Is out aligned? - MOVD OUT, X0 - - VSEL A0, B0, OUTMASK, DD0 // Collect pre-misaligned output - VSEL B0, C0, OUTMASK, DD1 - VSEL C0, D0, OUTMASK, DD2 - VSEL D0, A1, OUTMASK, DD3 - VSEL A1, B1, OUTMASK, B0 - VSEL B1, C1, OUTMASK, C0 - VSEL C1, D1, OUTMASK, D0 - VSEL D1, A2, OUTMASK, A1 - VSEL A2, B2, OUTMASK, B1 - VSEL B2, C2, OUTMASK, C1 - VSEL C2, D2, OUTMASK, D1 - - STVX DD0, (OUT+TMP0) - STVX DD1, (OUT+TMP1) - STVX DD2, (OUT+TMP2) - ADD $64, OUT, OUT - STVX DD3, (OUT+R0) - STVX B0, (OUT+TMP0) - STVX C0, (OUT+TMP1) - STVX D0, (OUT+TMP2) - ADD $64, OUT, OUT - STVX A1, (OUT+R0) - STVX B1, (OUT+TMP0) - STVX C1, (OUT+TMP1) - STVX D1, (OUT+TMP2) - ADD $64, OUT, OUT - - BEQ aligned_vmx - - SUB X1, OUT, X2 // in misaligned case edges - MOVD $0, X3 // are written byte-by-byte - -unaligned_tail_vmx: - STVEBX D2, (X2+X3) - ADD $1, X3, X3 - CMPW X3, X1 - BNE unaligned_tail_vmx - SUB X1, X0, X2 - -unaligned_head_vmx: - STVEBX A0, (X2+X1) - CMPW X1, $15 - ADD $1, X1, X1 - BNE unaligned_head_vmx - - CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet? - BGT loop_outer_vmx - - JMP done_vmx - -aligned_vmx: - STVX A0, (X0+R0) - CMPU LEN, $255 // done with 256-byte block yet? - BGT loop_outer_vmx - -done_vmx: - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go deleted file mode 100644 index ad74e23ae..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,31 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// +build go1.11 -// +build !gccgo - -package chacha20 - -const ( - haveAsm = true - bufSize = 256 -) - -//go:noescape -func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) - -func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { - - if len(src) >= bufSize { - xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) - } - - if len(src)%bufSize != 0 { - i := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize - c.buf = [bufSize]byte{} - copy(c.buf[:], src[i:]) - xorKeyStreamVX(c.buf[:], c.buf[:], &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) - c.len = bufSize - copy(dst[i:], c.buf[:len(src)%bufSize]) - } -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go deleted file mode 100644 index 6570847f5..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_generic.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,264 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// Package ChaCha20 implements the core ChaCha20 function as specified -// in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539#section-2.3. -package chacha20 - -import ( - "crypto/cipher" - "encoding/binary" - - "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" -) - -// assert that *Cipher implements cipher.Stream -var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) - -// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 using a particular key -// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. -type Cipher struct { - key [8]uint32 - counter uint32 // incremented after each block - nonce [3]uint32 - buf [bufSize]byte // buffer for unused keystream bytes - len int // number of unused keystream bytes at end of buf -} - -// New creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given key and nonce. -// The initial counter value is set to 0. -func New(key [8]uint32, nonce [3]uint32) *Cipher { - return &Cipher{key: key, nonce: nonce} -} - -// ChaCha20 constants spelling "expand 32-byte k" -const ( - j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 - j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e - j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 - j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 -) - -func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { - a += b - d ^= a - d = (d << 16) | (d >> 16) - c += d - b ^= c - b = (b << 12) | (b >> 20) - a += b - d ^= a - d = (d << 8) | (d >> 24) - c += d - b ^= c - b = (b << 7) | (b >> 25) - return a, b, c, d -} - -// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the -// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. -// -// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable -// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will -// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. -// -// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of -// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher -// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. -func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { - if len(dst) < len(src) { - panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") - } - if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst[:len(src)], src) { - panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") - } - - // xor src with buffered keystream first - if s.len != 0 { - buf := s.buf[len(s.buf)-s.len:] - if len(src) < len(buf) { - buf = buf[:len(src)] - } - td, ts := dst[:len(buf)], src[:len(buf)] // BCE hint - for i, b := range buf { - td[i] = ts[i] ^ b - } - s.len -= len(buf) - if s.len != 0 { - return - } - s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} // zero the empty buffer - src = src[len(buf):] - dst = dst[len(buf):] - } - - if len(src) == 0 { - return - } - if haveAsm { - if uint64(len(src))+uint64(s.counter)*64 > (1<<38)-64 { - panic("chacha20: counter overflow") - } - s.xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src) - return - } - - // set up a 64-byte buffer to pad out the final block if needed - // (hoisted out of the main loop to avoid spills) - rem := len(src) % 64 // length of final block - fin := len(src) - rem // index of final block - if rem > 0 { - copy(s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], src[fin:]) - } - - // pre-calculate most of the first round - s1, s5, s9, s13 := quarterRound(j1, s.key[1], s.key[5], s.nonce[0]) - s2, s6, s10, s14 := quarterRound(j2, s.key[2], s.key[6], s.nonce[1]) - s3, s7, s11, s15 := quarterRound(j3, s.key[3], s.key[7], s.nonce[2]) - - n := len(src) - src, dst = src[:n:n], dst[:n:n] // BCE hint - for i := 0; i < n; i += 64 { - // calculate the remainder of the first round - s0, s4, s8, s12 := quarterRound(j0, s.key[0], s.key[4], s.counter) - - // execute the second round - x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(s0, s5, s10, s15) - x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s1, s6, s11, s12) - x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s2, s7, s8, s13) - x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s3, s4, s9, s14) - - // execute the remaining 18 rounds - for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { - x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) - x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) - x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) - x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) - - x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) - x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) - x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) - x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) - } - - x0 += j0 - x1 += j1 - x2 += j2 - x3 += j3 - - x4 += s.key[0] - x5 += s.key[1] - x6 += s.key[2] - x7 += s.key[3] - x8 += s.key[4] - x9 += s.key[5] - x10 += s.key[6] - x11 += s.key[7] - - x12 += s.counter - x13 += s.nonce[0] - x14 += s.nonce[1] - x15 += s.nonce[2] - - // increment the counter - s.counter += 1 - if s.counter == 0 { - panic("chacha20: counter overflow") - } - - // pad to 64 bytes if needed - in, out := src[i:], dst[i:] - if i == fin { - // src[fin:] has already been copied into s.buf before - // the main loop - in, out = s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:] - } - in, out = in[:64], out[:64] // BCE hint - - // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result - xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0) - xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1) - xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2) - xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3) - xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4) - xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5) - xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6) - xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7) - xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8) - xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9) - xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10) - xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11) - xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12) - xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13) - xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14) - xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15) - } - // copy any trailing bytes out of the buffer and into dst - if rem != 0 { - s.len = 64 - rem - copy(dst[fin:], s.buf[len(s.buf)-64:]) - } -} - -// Advance discards bytes in the key stream until the next 64 byte block -// boundary is reached and updates the counter accordingly. If the key -// stream is already at a block boundary no bytes will be discarded and -// the counter will be unchanged. -func (s *Cipher) Advance() { - s.len -= s.len % 64 - if s.len == 0 { - s.buf = [len(s.buf)]byte{} - } -} - -// XORKeyStream crypts bytes from in to out using the given key and counters. -// In and out must overlap entirely or not at all. Counter contains the raw -// ChaCha20 counter bytes (i.e. block counter followed by nonce). -func XORKeyStream(out, in []byte, counter *[16]byte, key *[32]byte) { - s := Cipher{ - key: [8]uint32{ - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), - }, - nonce: [3]uint32{ - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[4:8]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[8:12]), - binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[12:16]), - }, - counter: binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(counter[0:4]), - } - s.XORKeyStream(out, in) -} - -// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a key and a -// nonce. It should only be used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. -func HChaCha20(key *[8]uint32, nonce *[4]uint32) [8]uint32 { - x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 - x4, x5, x6, x7 := key[0], key[1], key[2], key[3] - x8, x9, x10, x11 := key[4], key[5], key[6], key[7] - x12, x13, x14, x15 := nonce[0], nonce[1], nonce[2], nonce[3] - - for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { - x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) - x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) - x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) - x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) - - x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) - x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) - x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) - x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) - } - - var out [8]uint32 - out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3] = x0, x1, x2, x3 - out[4], out[5], out[6], out[7] = x12, x13, x14, x15 - return out -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go deleted file mode 100644 index bf8beba67..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,16 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// +build !ppc64le,!arm64,!s390x arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine - -package chacha20 - -const ( - bufSize = 64 - haveAsm = false -) - -func (*Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { - panic("not implemented") -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go deleted file mode 100644 index 638cb5e5d..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine - -package chacha20 - -import "encoding/binary" - -const ( - bufSize = 256 - haveAsm = true -) - -//go:noescape -func chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) - -func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { - if len(src) >= bufSize { - chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src)-len(src)%bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter) - } - if len(src)%bufSize != 0 { - chaCha20_ctr32_vmx(&c.buf[0], &c.buf[0], bufSize, &c.key, &c.counter) - start := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize - ts, td, tb := src[start:], dst[start:], c.buf[:] - // Unroll loop to XOR 32 bytes per iteration. - for i := 0; i < len(ts)-32; i += 32 { - td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination - s0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[0:8]) - s1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[8:16]) - s2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[16:24]) - s3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(ts[24:32]) - b0 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[0:8]) - b1 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[8:16]) - b2 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[16:24]) - b3 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(tb[24:32]) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[0:8], s0^b0) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[8:16], s1^b1) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[16:24], s2^b2) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(td[24:32], s3^b3) - ts, td, tb = ts[32:], td[32:], tb[32:] - } - td, tb = td[:len(ts)], tb[:len(ts)] // bounds check elimination - for i, v := range ts { - td[i] = tb[i] ^ v - } - c.len = bufSize - (len(src) % bufSize) - - } - -} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go deleted file mode 100644 index aad645b44..000000000 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -// +build s390x,!gccgo,!appengine - -package chacha20 - -import ( - "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" -) - -var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX - -const bufSize = 256 - -// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only -// be called when the vector facility is available. -// Implementation in asm_s390x.s. -//go:noescape -func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32, buf *[256]byte, len *int) - -func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamAsm(dst, src []byte) { - xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter, &c.buf, &c.len) -} - -// EXRL targets, DO NOT CALL! -func mvcSrcToBuf() -func mvcBufToDst() diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go index 73f4fe378..72a6a7394 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal/elgamal.go @@ -76,7 +76,9 @@ func Encrypt(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) (c1, c2 *big.Int, err // Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology (Crypto '98), func Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, c1, c2 *big.Int) (msg []byte, err error) { s := new(big.Int).Exp(c1, priv.X, priv.P) - s.ModInverse(s, priv.P) + if s.ModInverse(s, priv.P) == nil { + return nil, errors.New("elgamal: invalid private key") + } s.Mul(s, c2) s.Mod(s, priv.P) em := s.Bytes() diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go index 02b372cf3..6d7639722 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package packet import ( + "crypto" "crypto/rsa" "encoding/binary" "io" @@ -78,8 +79,9 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error { // padding oracle attacks. switch priv.PubKeyAlgo { case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly: - k := priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey) - b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), k, padToKeySize(&k.PublicKey, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)) + // Supports both *rsa.PrivateKey and crypto.Decrypter + k := priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Decrypter) + b, err = k.Decrypt(config.Random(), padToKeySize(k.Public().(*rsa.PublicKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes), nil) case PubKeyAlgoElGamal: c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes) c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go index 6f8ec0938..81abb7cef 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ type PrivateKey struct { encryptedData []byte cipher CipherFunction s2k func(out, in []byte) - PrivateKey interface{} // An *{rsa|dsa|ecdsa}.PrivateKey or a crypto.Signer. + PrivateKey interface{} // An *{rsa|dsa|ecdsa}.PrivateKey or crypto.Signer/crypto.Decrypter (Decryptor RSA only). sha1Checksum bool iv []byte } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..157a69f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +// Generic fallbacks for the math/bits intrinsics, copied from +// src/math/bits/bits.go. They were added in Go 1.12, but Add64 and Sum64 had +// variable time fallbacks until Go 1.13. + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + sum = x + y + carry + carryOut = ((x & y) | ((x | y) &^ sum)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + diff = x - y - borrow + borrowOut = ((^x & y) | (^(x ^ y) & diff)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + const mask32 = 1<<32 - 1 + x0 := x & mask32 + x1 := x >> 32 + y0 := y & mask32 + y1 := y >> 32 + w0 := x0 * y0 + t := x1*y0 + w0>>32 + w1 := t & mask32 + w2 := t >> 32 + w1 += x0 * y1 + hi = x1*y1 + w2 + w1>>32 + lo = x * y + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a0a185f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +import "math/bits" + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + return bits.Add64(x, y, carry) +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + return bits.Sub64(x, y, borrow) +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + return bits.Mul64(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go index d076a5623..066159b79 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ import "crypto/subtle" // TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. const TagSize = 16 -// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given -// key. +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + sum(out, m, key) +} + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { var tmp [16]byte Sum(&tmp, m, key) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go index 2dbf42aa5..df56a652f 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go @@ -7,62 +7,52 @@ package poly1305 //go:noescape -func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte) +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) -//go:noescape -func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) - -//go:noescape -func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64) - -// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { h := newMAC(key) h.Write(m) h.Sum(out) } func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) { - initialize(&h.state, key) + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) return } -type mac struct { - state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 } - - buffer [TagSize]byte - offset int -} +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } -func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { - n = len(p) +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) if h.offset > 0 { - remaining := TagSize - h.offset - if n < remaining { - h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) - return n, nil + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil } - copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining]) - p = p[remaining:] + p = p[n:] h.offset = 0 - update(&h.state, h.buffer[:]) + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) } - if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 { - update(&h.state, p[:nn]) - p = p[nn:] + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] } if len(p) > 0 { h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) } - return n, nil + return nn, nil } func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { - state := h.state + state := h.macState if h.offset > 0 { update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) } - finalize(out, &state) + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s index 7d600f13c..8c0cefbb3 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -54,10 +54,6 @@ ADCQ t3, h1; \ ADCQ $0, h2 -DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF -DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC -GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 - // func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 MOVQ state+0(FP), DI @@ -110,39 +106,3 @@ done: MOVQ R9, 8(DI) MOVQ R10, 16(DI) RET - -// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte) -TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16 - MOVQ state+0(FP), DI - MOVQ key+8(FP), SI - - // state[0...7] is initialized with zero - MOVOU 0(SI), X0 - MOVOU 16(SI), X1 - MOVOU ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), X2 - PAND X2, X0 - MOVOU X0, 24(DI) - MOVOU X1, 40(DI) - RET - -// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64) -TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16 - MOVQ tag+0(FP), DI - MOVQ state+8(FP), SI - - MOVQ 0(SI), AX - MOVQ 8(SI), BX - MOVQ 16(SI), CX - MOVQ AX, R8 - MOVQ BX, R9 - SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX - SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX - SBBQ $3, CX - CMOVQCS R8, AX - CMOVQCS R9, BX - ADDQ 40(SI), AX - ADCQ 48(SI), BX - - MOVQ AX, 0(DI) - MOVQ BX, 8(DI) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go index 5dc321c2f..6e695e427 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go @@ -6,14 +6,11 @@ package poly1305 -// This function is implemented in sum_arm.s +// poly1305_auth_armv6 is implemented in sum_arm.s //go:noescape func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte) -// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { var mPtr *byte if len(m) > 0 { mPtr = &m[0] diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go index bab76ef0d..1187eab78 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go @@ -2,18 +2,29 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. +// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files +// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code. + package poly1305 import "encoding/binary" -const ( - msgBlock = uint32(1 << 24) - finalBlock = uint32(0) -) +// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag +// for a 64 bytes message is approximately +// +// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like +// +// for len(msg) > 0: +// h += read(msg, 16) +// h *= r +// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// return h + s +// +// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers +// larger than any available numeric type. -// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and -// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of -// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available. func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { h := newMACGeneric(key) h.Write(msg) @@ -21,152 +32,276 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { } func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) { - h.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff - h.r[1] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03 - h.r[2] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff - h.r[3] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff - h.r[4] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff - - h.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:]) - h.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:]) - h.s[2] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:]) - h.s[3] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:]) + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) return } +// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is, +// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸. +type macState struct { + // h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but + // can grow larger during and after rounds. + h [3]uint64 + // r and s are the private key components. + r [2]uint64 + s [2]uint64 +} + type macGeneric struct { - h, r [5]uint32 - s [4]uint32 + macState buffer [TagSize]byte offset int } -func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { - n = len(p) +// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to +// update. It buffers incomplete chunks. +func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) if h.offset > 0 { - remaining := TagSize - h.offset - if n < remaining { - h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) - return n, nil + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil } - copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining]) - p = p[remaining:] + p = p[n:] h.offset = 0 - updateGeneric(h.buffer[:], msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r)) + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) } - if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 { - updateGeneric(p, msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r)) - p = p[nn:] + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] } if len(p) > 0 { h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) } - return n, nil + return nn, nil } -func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[16]byte) { - H, R := h.h, h.r +// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates +// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple +// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum. +func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState if h.offset > 0 { - var buffer [TagSize]byte - copy(buffer[:], h.buffer[:h.offset]) - buffer[h.offset] = 1 // invariant: h.offset < TagSize - updateGeneric(buffer[:], finalBlock, &H, &R) + updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) } - finalizeGeneric(out, &H, &(h.s)) + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} + +// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It +// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement +// multiplication more efficiently. +const ( + rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF + rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +) + +func initialize(key *[32]byte, r, s *[2]uint64) { + r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0 + r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1 + s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24]) + s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32]) +} + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} } -func updateGeneric(msg []byte, flag uint32, h, r *[5]uint32) { - h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] - r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 := uint64(r[0]), uint64(r[1]), uint64(r[2]), uint64(r[3]), uint64(r[4]) - R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5 - - for len(msg) >= TagSize { - // h += msg - h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[0:]) & 0x3ffffff - h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff - h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff - h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff - h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | flag - - // h *= r - d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1) - d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2) - d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3) - d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4) - d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0) - - // h %= p - h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff - h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff - h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff - h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff - h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff - - h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5 - h1 += h0 >> 26 - h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff - - msg = msg[TagSize:] +func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 { + lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0) + hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c) + if c != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") } + return uint128{lo, hi} +} - h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] = h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 +func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 { + a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62 + a.hi = a.hi >> 2 + return a } -func finalizeGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[5]uint32, s *[4]uint32) { - h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] - - // h %= p reduction - h2 += h1 >> 26 - h1 &= 0x3ffffff - h3 += h2 >> 26 - h2 &= 0x3ffffff - h4 += h3 >> 26 - h3 &= 0x3ffffff - h0 += 5 * (h4 >> 26) - h4 &= 0x3ffffff - h1 += h0 >> 26 - h0 &= 0x3ffffff - - // h - p - t0 := h0 + 5 - t1 := h1 + (t0 >> 26) - t2 := h2 + (t1 >> 26) - t3 := h3 + (t2 >> 26) - t4 := h4 + (t3 >> 26) - (1 << 26) - t0 &= 0x3ffffff - t1 &= 0x3ffffff - t2 &= 0x3ffffff - t3 &= 0x3ffffff - - // select h if h < p else h - p - t_mask := (t4 >> 31) - 1 - h_mask := ^t_mask - h0 = (h0 & h_mask) | (t0 & t_mask) - h1 = (h1 & h_mask) | (t1 & t_mask) - h2 = (h2 & h_mask) | (t2 & t_mask) - h3 = (h3 & h_mask) | (t3 & t_mask) - h4 = (h4 & h_mask) | (t4 & t_mask) - - // h %= 2^128 - h0 |= h1 << 26 - h1 = ((h1 >> 6) | (h2 << 20)) - h2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) - h3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 << 8)) - - // s: the s part of the key - // tag = (h + s) % (2^128) - t := uint64(h0) + uint64(s[0]) - h0 = uint32(t) - t = uint64(h1) + uint64(s[1]) + (t >> 32) - h1 = uint32(t) - t = uint64(h2) + uint64(s[2]) + (t >> 32) - h2 = uint32(t) - t = uint64(h3) + uint64(s[3]) + (t >> 32) - h3 = uint32(t) - - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:], h1) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:], h2) - binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:], h3) +// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of +// 128 bits of message, it computes +// +// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last +// incomplete chunk is the final one. +func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) { + h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] + r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1] + + for len(msg) > 0 { + var c uint64 + + // For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics. + // The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially + // reduced at the end of the multiplication below. + // + // The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to + // hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just + // add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2. + if len(msg) >= TagSize { + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + 1 + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } else { + var buf [TagSize]byte + copy(buf[:], msg) + buf[len(msg)] = 1 + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + + msg = nil + } + + // Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school + // columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs. + // + // We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r. + // + // h2 h1 h0 x + // r1 r0 = + // ---------------- + // h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products + // + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1 + // ------------------------ + // m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs + // ------------------------ + // m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation + // + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo + // ------------------------------- + // t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs + // + // The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do + // carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums + // at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once. + + h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0) + h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0) + h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0) + h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1) + h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1) + h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1) + + // Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their + // top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going + // to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products. + // + // This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4). + if h2r0.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + if h2r1.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + + m0 := h0r0 + m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again + m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1. + m3 := h2r1 + + t0 := m0.lo + t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0) + t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c) + t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c) + + // Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it + // modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do + // a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity + // + // c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 + // + // because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is + // likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the + // assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code. + // + // See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23 + + // We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry. + // Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other + // words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity. + h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits + cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3} + + // To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c. + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + cc = shiftRightBy2(cc) + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + // h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most + // + // 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1 + } + + state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2 +} + +const ( + maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003 + maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits +) + +// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time. +func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y } + +// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order. +const ( + p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB + p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + p2 = 0x0000000000000003 +) + +// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes +// +// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ +// +func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) { + h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2] + + // After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than + // 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction + // in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the + // result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise. + + hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0) + hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b) + _, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b) + + // h = h if h < p else h - p + h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0) + h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1) + + // Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step + // + // tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ + // + // by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding + // the overflow. + h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0) + h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go index 8a9c2070b..1682eda45 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go @@ -6,10 +6,7 @@ package poly1305 -// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { +func sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { h := newMAC(key) h.Write(msg) h.Sum(out) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go index 2402b6371..323361693 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go @@ -7,62 +7,52 @@ package poly1305 //go:noescape -func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte) +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) -//go:noescape -func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) - -//go:noescape -func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64) - -// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { h := newMAC(key) h.Write(m) h.Sum(out) } func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) { - initialize(&h.state, key) + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) return } -type mac struct { - state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 } - - buffer [TagSize]byte - offset int -} +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } -func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { - n = len(p) +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) if h.offset > 0 { - remaining := TagSize - h.offset - if n < remaining { - h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) - return n, nil + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil } - copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining]) - p = p[remaining:] + p = p[n:] h.offset = 0 - update(&h.state, h.buffer[:]) + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) } - if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 { - update(&h.state, p[:nn]) - p = p[nn:] + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] } if len(p) > 0 { h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) } - return n, nil + return nn, nil } func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { - state := h.state + state := h.macState if h.offset > 0 { update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) } - finalize(out, &state) + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s index 55c7167ec..4e20bf299 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 // func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) - TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 MOVD state+0(FP), R3 MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4 @@ -180,68 +179,3 @@ done: MOVD R9, 8(R3) MOVD R10, 16(R3) RET - -// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte) -TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16 - MOVD state+0(FP), R3 - MOVD key+8(FP), R4 - - // state[0...7] is initialized with zero - // Load key - MOVD 0(R4), R5 - MOVD 8(R4), R6 - MOVD 16(R4), R7 - MOVD 24(R4), R8 - - // Address of key mask - MOVD $·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R9 - - // Save original key in state - MOVD R7, 40(R3) - MOVD R8, 48(R3) - - // Get mask - MOVD (R9), R7 - MOVD 8(R9), R8 - - // And with key - AND R5, R7, R5 - AND R6, R8, R6 - - // Save masked key in state - MOVD R5, 24(R3) - MOVD R6, 32(R3) - RET - -// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64) -TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16 - MOVD tag+0(FP), R3 - MOVD state+8(FP), R4 - - // Get h0, h1, h2 from state - MOVD 0(R4), R5 - MOVD 8(R4), R6 - MOVD 16(R4), R7 - - // Save h0, h1 - MOVD R5, R8 - MOVD R6, R9 - MOVD $3, R20 - MOVD $-1, R21 - SUBC $-5, R5 - SUBE R21, R6 - SUBE R20, R7 - MOVD $0, R21 - SUBZE R21 - - // Check for carry - CMP $0, R21 - ISEL $2, R5, R8, R5 - ISEL $2, R6, R9, R6 - MOVD 40(R4), R8 - MOVD 48(R4), R9 - ADDC R8, R5 - ADDE R9, R6 - MOVD R5, 0(R3) - MOVD R6, 8(R3) - RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go index ec99e07e9..a8920ee9d 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -22,10 +22,7 @@ func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) //go:noescape func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) -// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the -// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same -// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. -func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { if cpu.S390X.HasVX { var mPtr *byte if len(m) > 0 { diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go index a65a923be..b0204ee59 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -16,9 +16,8 @@ import ( "hash" "io" "io/ioutil" - "math/bits" - "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" ) @@ -642,8 +641,8 @@ const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" // the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6 // also requires of stream ciphers. type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { - lengthKey [8]uint32 - contentKey [8]uint32 + lengthKey [32]byte + contentKey [32]byte buf []byte } @@ -656,21 +655,21 @@ func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionA buf: make([]byte, 256), } - for i := range c.contentKey { - c.contentKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[i*4 : (i+1)*4]) - } - for i := range c.lengthKey { - c.lengthKey[i] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[(i+8)*4 : (i+9)*4]) - } + copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) + copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) return c, nil } func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { - nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)} - s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce) - var polyKey [32]byte + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) - s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { @@ -678,7 +677,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([ } var lenBytes [4]byte - chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) if length > maxPacket { @@ -724,11 +727,15 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([ } func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { - nonce := [3]uint32{0, 0, bits.ReverseBytes32(seqNum)} - s := chacha20.New(c.contentKey, nonce) - var polyKey [32]byte + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) - s.Advance() // skip next 32 bytes + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. @@ -748,7 +755,11 @@ func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, r } binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) - chacha20.New(c.lengthKey, nonce).XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) c.buf[4] = byte(padding) copy(c.buf[5:], payload) packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go index 16072004b..6c3c648fc 100644 --- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handsha HostKey: hostKeyBytes, Signature: sig, Hash: crypto.SHA1, - }, nil + }, err } // ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index 68834ae7f..414c80277 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/bsonrw go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/bsontype go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson/primitive go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/x/bsonx/bsoncore -# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190927123631-a832865fa7ad +# golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191117063200-497ca9f6d64f golang.org/x/crypto/acme golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert golang.org/x/crypto/argon2 @@ -444,10 +444,10 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish golang.org/x/crypto/cast5 +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519 -golang.org/x/crypto/internal/chacha20 golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle golang.org/x/crypto/md4 golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp